OKEHAMPTON, 1895. 73, 
POINTS MOST OFTEN NOTICED IN COMMANDANT’S 
i j CRITICISMS. 
It may seem presumptuous in me to speak of faults committed, but 
I hope you will all understand that I am not airing my own views, but 
am only putting before you the points of general importance most fre- 
quently remarked upon in the Commandant’s criticisms. The objects 
of this lecture must be borne in mind—they are, I take it, twofold. 
First, to give an opportunity for all officers interested in the subject 
to meet and discuss in a friendly way the various points that arise in con- 
nection with the year’s practice, while it is fresh in all minds, and before 
the changes, if any, for the next year have been settled. Secondly, 
to give officers serving abroad, who would not see the Annual Report 
of the School of Gunnery, an opportunity of learning, through the 
Institution “‘ Proceedings,” what is being done at home. Of the 
utility of the latter I can speak from personal experience while in 
India. 
In drawing attention to the points criticised, I shall endeavour to 
provide you with many pegs on which to hang discussion. 
Want or Due Estimation or THe TacticaL SiTuaTIoN. 
The fault of the season undoubtedly was want of due estimation of . 
the tactical situation ; and this was shown in many ways, which I have — 
grouped under the following heads: 
Choice of position and method of occupying it. 
Formations adopted. _— 
Reconnaissance. 
Ranging. 
Choice of sights. 
Choice and Occupation of Position. 
Positions were not unfrequently chosen without reference to the 
work to be done. The most common fault of all was to take upa 
position with reference only to the individual target first engaged. A 
Brigade Division supporting an infantry attack had to advance about 
100 yards in order to bring fire to bear on the point of attack; and a 
battery ordered to resist the enemy’s advance down a certain valley 
came into action where only the high ground at the end of the valley 
where the column first appeared was visible, so that unless the enemy 
stopped at the first round a change of position was inevitable. Com- 
mand of all ground on which fire would be likely to be required would 
appear to be a first essential for a good artillery position; and it is 
mainly because this condition cannot be attained from under cover that 
I cannot believe in the use of such positions except on very rare occa- 
sions on service; putting altogether aside the demoralising results of 
training men to hide behind hills. 
There were far fewer cases of the misuse of the “ deliberate” than 
have had to be spoken of in previous years, and that I have no doubt- 
