74, OKEHAMPTON, 1895. 
is in a great measure due to the discussion in this room last year; but 
there were several cases of batteries being halted in a “‘ covered posi- 
tion ” which was not wnder cover, and more where, though the battery 
was concealed when halted in this position, the approach to it had been 
in full view of the enemy. ‘The deliberate method was also occasionally 
used when it was tactically wrong. For instance, an advanced guard 
battery ordered to brush aside advanced parties, and specially warned 
not to delay the main body, used the deliberate method, but the drill-book 
says of such action “ As the essence of success in this case is to prevent 
the enemy from gaining time the artillery must be prepared to commence 
action at once at a decisive range.”’ 
Formations. 
The formations adopted occasionally showed that the ruleson this point 
in Chapter LV. Field Artillery Drill under “ Employment and conduct of 
Artillery in the Field” had not been sufficiently studied. The intervals 
were frequently at fault, and in one case the lesson was brought home.. 
The first two batteries of a Brigade Division to come into action took be- 
tween them 65 yards more than their proper front with the result that 
the third battery was absolutely crowded out. With large forces this 
tendency to spread beyond limits would be very serious and might 
greatly interfere with the combined action of all arms. 
To take another instance. In emerging from a defile under fire 
batteries frequently formed line directly to the front instead of im- 
mediately clearing away to a flank—probably with disastrous results to 
the batteries following them. 
Again, surely when in pursuit of broken troops batteries should be 
pushed into action as rapidly as possible without waiting for a simul- 
taneous advance of the Brigade Division. 
Reconnaissance. 
In 1893 Major Hughes drew attention to the dislike of Brigade 
Division and Battery Commanders to leave their commands and 
advance well ahead to reconnoitre. On the part of Brigade Division 
Commanders this has practically disappeared, but Majors for the most 
part still show great reluctance to leave their batteries. It is not only 
important that the Battery Commander should be accustomed to leave © 
his battery, but that the subalterns should be accustomed to being 
left. This was shown where the battery was attacked in the absence 
of the Major, and here again I will quote a looker-on of another 
arm: ‘‘The subaltern officers showed the same inevitable want of 
confidence I have seen in young officers in other branches.” We can 
scarcely wonder at it if they never get a chance. 
Ranging. 
The system of ranging is now generally understood and acted on 
throughout, but it is apt to be made a cast-iron rule and the modifi- 
cations which the tactical situation demands, and which the drill- 
book allows, ave often neglected. A column of fours is surely an 
excellent instance of a case “where it is desired to take advantage - 
