OKEHAMPTON, 1895, 81 
an easy target without being able to put in three effective shell it must 
have been evident to those most opposed to “the new ideas” that 
something was wrong. For the next year or two, things went on much 
in the same way, but in 1891 in the discussion here two warnings were 
uttered—certainly not before they were wanted. ‘Two inventions, each 
useful in its place—were being run to death by their injudicious 
admirers. I refer to the deliberate method and to Scotts’ sights. From 
a careful reading of the instructions it seems to me that no other 
system of occupying a position at practice was contemplated, and the 
deliberate, as we now understand it, is dashing compared with the 
deliberate of those days. Of the injudicious use of Scotts’ sights I 
have already spoken. In 1891 they seem to have been almost universally 
employed—even with case ! 
In 1892 tactics made its appearance. Everyone had been convinced 
of the necessity and of the difficulty of hitting and so “ three effective 
shrapnel’? dropped back to elementary. Hach days service practice 
was under a tactical scheme, but service conditions were scarcely 
attempted—no doubt the time had not arrived for it. Batteries knew 
their targets and the number of rounds they had to fire at each before 
they went out, and the orders given were scarcely such as they would 
receive on service; forinstance a General who wished a battery to ad- 
vance would not send an order “ prepare to advance” first! In 1893 
and 1894 there was little change in the general conditions of practice. 
In 1893 surprise targets were introduced and in 1894 an infantry 
moving target. What was done this year I have already described. 
Taking the battery service practice generally it is easy to follow 
the changes. At first it was a mere question of target shooting ; 
from a certain spot you had to hit a certain thing. Hlaborate pre- 
parations were made beforehand and all attention was directed to 
the task of hitting—and rightly so—for until that was mastered it was 
useless to complicate matters. As batteries improved and Battery 
Commanders became experienced in the control of their fire the move- 
ments into position were studied, the barrier between gunnery and 
manoeuvre was broken down. Batteries carne into action at Aldershot 
field-days as they would at Okehampton, and when they came to 
Okehampton manceuvred as they had learnt to do at Aldershot. We 
all admit that fire discipline and fire tactics are both necessary for the 
effective application of our fire, and now I think we are all agreed that 
they must be practised together. But this feeling is only of recent 
growth, I remember the horror caused at Okehampton in 1888 when - 
attempts were made to manceuvre a Brigade Division. Everyone was 
most indignant ‘‘ we don’t come to Okehampton to drill”? was the cry. 
BrigaDE Division PRAcTICE. 
About Brigade Division practice there is really little to say. In 1888 
a system was laid down for the Lieut-Colonel to “range” his Brigade 
Division, but that quickly dropped out and it was recognised that the 
battery was the unit for fire discipline and the Brigade Division 
for fire tactics. In consequence the question of tactics came in 
earlier for the Brigade Division practice than for the battery, and 
