OKEHAMPTON, 1895. 89 
when I told you how from the neglect of it in one Brigade Division a battery was 
completely shouldered out. If you have two or three Brigade Divisions in action 
as well as other troops it is likely to be still more important. 
About the range at which Battery Commanders should order ‘‘ case,” it is laid 
down in the drill-book as soon as the enemy get within 500 yards. If you order 
“case”? at 500 yards I do not think you will get the first round off against galloping 
cavalry until they are pretty close on 300 yards. ‘The subject of the weight of 
case bullets is important and I believe that experiments are being made. I think 
it is doubtful (and other officers no doubt agree with me) whether our little case 
bullets would stop a horse. 
About the Glenbeigh experiments of which Major Paterson has told us and 
which are so interesting, there is one point to remember and that is that they were 
on sand and that sand is the most favourable thing for infantry because the man 
can sometimes see his bullets hitting on it as he cannot on ordinary ground. And 
also it was scarcely fair conditions. On a hillside you do not know exactly wherea 
battery is coming into action. I should like to see infantry at Okehampton 
told that a battery is coming into action on a certain hill and not told the exact 
spot or moment and six cavalry targets (which would represent the teams very well) 
pulled over the crest of the hill fifty yards down the front, at the walk if you like, 
and back again and then see how many hits they would make. The time during 
which a battery coming into action shows itself is very little. I was in splinter- 
proofs during a great deal of the practice this year and it struck me, when you 
come to look at it from the target point of view, that a battery is not such a big 
thing as you think ; six guns coming into action quickly give little opportunity of 
shooting. In the case of one that came well down the hillside into action; from 
the moment we saw the Battery Commander’s head appear over the crest until 
the first gun went off was only one minute 20 seconds. Ido not think much 
harm could have been done in that time. 
As regards indistinct targets, | am myself a great believer in the use, as soon 
as we get a good clinometer, of indirect laying against such targets when they are 
like artillery in action. But I hope that no one will misunderstand me 
when I say indirect laying and believe that I am advocating going behind a hill 
and firing over the top. I mean using the clinometer instead of the Scott’s sight 
for elevation the direction being given from the handspike. The practice would 
then be quicker and more accurate. But it is impossible for a moving target; 
you can only useit for guns in action or against shelter trenches where there 
is no chance of moving. 
I do not think there has been any other point brought up which I could attempt 
to answer. 
Tur CHarrman—Gentlemen, it only remains to us to accord a very hearty 
vote of thanks to Captain Headlam for giving us this most interesting lecture. I 
had hoped that more gentlemen wouid have given us the benefit of their experience 
who have been through the manceuvres this year and which would have provoked 
further discussion; but I am sure that we shall be unanimous in according a 
hearty vote of thanks to Captain Headlam. (Loud applause.) 
Note.—I find that I accidentally omitted to reply to Major Baldock. The drill 
certainly appears to only recognise the position directly in rear for the limbers and 
wagons, and I can not see how any other can be worked where yon have not only 
more than one battery but other troops as well. In the case Major Baldock quoted of 
all the wagons and limbers of a Brigade Division being huddled together under 
cover imagine the confusion when the Brigade Division was ordered to advance— 
particularly if a brigade of cavalry or infantry had slipped in between the guns and 
the limbers—by no means unlikely ! 
rr 
