116 MARLBOROUGH AND HIS METHODS OF WARFARE. 
from Brussels, as you see on the map, past the river Scheldt, north 
of Oudenarde, attacked the Duke of Burgundy and Vendéme at * 
Oudenarde, utterly routed them by almost making a semicircle round 
them, and drove them back by Gavre to Ghent and thence to a position on 
the Brugesand Ghent canalat Lovendeghem. Thusby another very strik- 
ing advance against another distinguished French general, and a good 
strategic plan followed by effective tactical strokes he was able to enter 
into France itself. I said at the beginning Marlborough never failed, 
and we now see Marlborough at one of the greatest sieges of history ; 
he went now to the siege of Lille. A map of the siege of Lille is 
before you. lille was the master-piece of Vauban. Now Vauban’s 
system of engineering I do not propose to discuss ; and if I did discuss 
it not much attention would be paid to what I said on the subject. I 
am sure there are plenty of engineer and artillery officers here who 
can, if they’ please, give us some information about this master-piece 
of Vauban. lInille was invested by Hugene and covered by Marl- 
borough, and the French made continued efforts to raise the siege. 
They had 110,000 men, but they were never able either to cut off 
Marlborough’s supplies or to raise the siege (see Appendix). 
Gentlemen, a very important matter in tactics in which problems are 
constantly set in convoy action. The first great convoy of this time— 
the first of the two convoy movements in connection with the siege 
was the march of the siege-train from Brussels down to Lille itself. 
That was a very remarkable event in logistics and was the subject for 
much admiring comment throughout the eighteenth century. The 
allies brought in the face of a very strong enemy, 3000 wagons and 
16,000 horses and 90 guns, extending sixteen miles, and for about 70 
miles safely in spite of the threats of a strong hostile force. I 
put up the various distances in these campaigns on the wall, and I 
have no doubt that they will appear in print in due time. The next 
convoy action was when the allies lost the command of the Lille and 
Brussels road through the overwhelming numbers of the French. 
The English having command of the sea had their base everywhere ; 
accordingly they had to get supplies from Ostend, but the French 
army was there on the Bruges-Ghent canal. That led to the action 
called the convoy action of Wynendale in which General Webb 
managed, notwithstanding the efforts of the French De La Motte, to 
break through and bring supplies and troops to the besiegers. I have 
not the least doubt that some of the tactical authorities here can take 
part if they please in the discussion on the action of Wynendale, and 
therefore I omit its details, but they are most valuable lessons even 
now. The next great siege was Mons in 1709. huille fell in 1708. 
Nowthere is nocountry more recuperative in its resources than France. 
At the beginning of 1709 there was misery of the acutest kind, famine, 
financial difficulties and military depression, but the allies were too 
severe in their terms, and France rose to the occasion, equipped 
another army under Villars, who moved from Le Quesnoi towards 
Mons, which the allies were besieging. That led to the battle of 
Malplaquet. This battle of Malplaquet was the most sanguinary battle 
till the battle of Hylau in Hast Prussia in 1809, 100 years later; it was 
