MARLBOROUGH AND HUIS METHODS OF WARFARE. iY/ 
a case of sheer hard fighting ; there was a wood on the French right, 
Laniere, an entrenchment near the village itself in the cantre, and a 
wood on the French left, Taisniere. General Withers was on the 
allied right, Marlborough and Hugene in the centre, Orange on the 
left. You see the whole line was attacked, but the left attack was 
the threatening turning movement. Whereupon the French com- 
mander detached from his centre to the left (all these movements 
were set forth on a black-board). The result was that Marlborough 
forced the centre with tremendous havoc in spite of the bravery, not 
only of Villars himself, but of another veteran French officer, the 
celebrated Boufflers. Mons fell soon afterwards. This, gentlemen, is 
the last of the four immortal victories in which Hnglish soldiers, at the 
beginning of the eighteenth century, planted the standard of St. 
George, to some effect, amongst the numerous hosts of their ancient 
enemies led by their most skilled and trusted chieftains. 
But party spirit now began to replace wisdom and patriotism in 
English politics. I will not relate Sacheverell’s case and the subse- 
quent electioneering turmoil. Gentlemen, I do not object to party. You 
must not imagine anything of the kind; but I object to either party 
men, or indeed any politicians intruding themselves into the sphere 
of military action. As to party, I just make as much row at an election 
as any other man. Ido my level best to promote the success of the 
cause which I have the honour sometimes of being allowed to 
champion; I think it a good cause, but supposing that a general 
who won a battle happened to be of the opposite party, would it not 
be carrying the spirit of party to the utmost baseness to refuse honour 
to a leader who had saved his country simply because he did not walk 
across with us from one lobby of the House of Commons to the other 
on a occasion of mere local and temporary importance? The successful 
party now determined to ruin Marlborough, but before they had 
ruined him, he had ruined Villars, and he very nearly managed to get 
into Paris. His schemes in 1709 and 1710 were of the utmost daring 
—far in advance of his age. He wanted to mass his troops and force 
or mask the northern line of French fortresses, and to march straight 
on Paris. He was prevented by the Dutch; but Villars, fearing this 
manoeuvre, constructed the ne plus ultra lines, and these will prac- 
tically be also the ne plus ultra of my claim upon your patience this 
cyvening. They stretched from Namur to Calais; an enormous line 
it was. I hope some gentlemen will discuss these lines and their 
military value; I believe these lines in no respect resemble the lines 
of Torres, Vedras and such like; but that we shall see later on. 
Marlborough forced these lines—which were protected by the most 
able Frenchmen and a very gallant army and by all the chivalry 
of France, fed by the sale of the jewels of the ladies of France. 
Marlborough resolved to take Arleux, not because he wanted to take 
it, but because he wanted Villars to think that he regarded it as 
of special value. Accordingly he made desperate efforts to take it 
and succeeded and began to fortify it, but Villars recaptured the 
posts. Marlborough then made a flank march along the lines to 
the left as if he were about to carry the position of Montenancourt. 
