118 MARLBOROUGH AND HIS METHODS OF WARFARE. 
He lost his temper for once in his life; he was a man of perfect 
temper, nothing could disturb his calm serenity of soul, and he had 
some interesting and exciting domestic causes that would try most 
people’s temper, into which I have not time to enter this evening, but 
on this occasion he positively displayed almost childish petulance—he 
reconnoitred the lines near Villars-le-bois direction, rode up to them 
and appointed the places for attack. It so happened that at this point 
they were almost impregnable, whereupon Villars closed up to his own 
left, and Marlborough, to deceive, placed his own army in touch with 
his and issued orders for an engagement to the amazement of friend 
and foe alike. But after completely misleading the French he sent 
Cadogan, August 4th, with a considerable force to join Hompesch from 
Douay, and together they crossed the causeway at Aubanchoil-am- 
bac about 8 a.m. They were within the enemy’s lines with no loss, 
after them came the main body of the allied army. It made a rapid 
night march, and by 5 a.m., August 5th, reached the banks of the 
Scarpe, near Vitry, passed by pontoons, and by 8 a.m. reached 
Aubanchoil. Villars followed hard after them and drew up in line 
of battle on the 7th, but Marlborough again passed the Scheldt and 
invested Bouchain, which fell September 12th. This whole manceuvre 
was master-piece of strategy and ruse. As this flank march was the 
very finest display of a flank movement, and a turning movement com- 
bined, and an admirable example of a successful movement by night, I 
hope the Secretary will allow me to describe the lines and the move- 
mentinan Appendix. Thus the ne plus ultra was broken. Whereupon 
Eugene, who was absent, wrote to Marlborough and said you have put 
an end to Villars and his ne plus ultra. After the capture of Bouchain 
our hero was recalled and disgraced atthe end of the year, and, gentle- 
men, | have practically come to the end of this lecture. 
But, my Lord, and gentlemen, there is one thing that I did not refer 
to, and that is the question of the command of the sea, without which 
England is nothing at all for defence or aggression. You may say 
what have Marlborough’s campaigns to do with the command of the sea ? 
Well, I would not like to answer that question on my own authority 
merely, and accordingly I answer it on the authority of Captain Mahan. 
If it pleases you I can read his words: “The sea power of Hngland 
therefore” (referring to this very struggle) “was not merely in the 
great navy with which we too commonly and exclusively associate it. 
France had such a navy in 1688 and it shrivelled away like a leaf in 
the fire. Neither was it in a prosperous commerce alone. A few 
years after the date at which we have arrived, the commerce of France 
took on fair proportions, but the first blast of Marlborough’s war 
trumpet swept away the commerce of both France and Holland ; it 
was in the union of Hngland’s navy and its commerce, and its army 
carefully fostered that England made the gain of sea power over and 
beyond all others, and this gain is distinctly associated with and dates 
from the war of the Spanish Succession” (that is to say from 1702 to 1713, 
the period of Marlborough’s campaigns). “Before that war England was 
one of the sea Powers; after that war she was the sea Power; this power 
she held alone unshared by friend and unchecked by foe.” Therefore, 
