MARLBOROUGH AND HIS METHODS OF WARFARE. 121 
it at some selected spot and there to break it. But the weakness of the great 
French line, which has been more or less discarded by the French now, in the 
original arrangement of the defence of France after 1870, does not lie in that 
direction. The character of armies as it was in that time has in our own changed 
in this respect: that whereas in those days no army which could be gathered could 
possibly have occupied that front through which Marlborough broke or anything 
approaching to it, in our time armies are so enormous that even that whole 
length of front, which has been fortified at the cost of milliards on the frontier 
of France, wouid be occupied by French soldiers from end to end as nearly as 
possible, only that in order to occupy it they have to get there; and the difficulty 
in our time of any such operation becomes one rather of the movement of troops 
by railway, and the concentration of forces for that purpose, and all the rest of 
the huge problem involved in getting the troops there and maintaining them, 
rather than the particular difficulties that presented themselves in this case of the 
defence of France on that long line. So I do not think the analogy in that in- 
stance is as close as that of many other of the points to be learned from Marl- 
borough in their bearing upon our own time. I am sure that it is of the greatest 
value to us as soldiers to get those points brought out which are still applicable to 
modern war. Lord Wolseley will be able to draw out for us the lessons which 
he has himself exhibited before us in our own time, and which are more closely 
analogous to those of Marlborough than of any other general. I speak especially 
of the questions of ruse, the concealment of design, and imposition upon the 
enemy, as to what is intended and so on. I think if we can only induce him to 
talk about these we shall have done a great deal more towards the practical appli- 
cation of the experiences of Marlborough’s time to our own than we could in 
any other way. 
Masor R. H. Murpocu—My Lord. Considering that England’s only general 
and professional commander-in-chief under the Queen, Anne, never attempted any 
operation of war, small or great, without having first on the ground a due com- 
plement of artillery, it may seem a reflection on artillery records that details of 
the constitution and services of the artillery of Marlborough have never been 
published. The fact is that these details do exist in entirety; but they are 
buried—partly in the Public Record Office in Fetter Lane, and partly in the 
family archives at Blenheim Palace. Now, as Marlborough’s adjutant-general 
was an artillery officer—Brigadier Jacob Richards—there must be in the Blen- 
heim MSS. artillery reports and details of the most essential interest. No one 
can properly utilise the artillery records in the Public Record Office unless they 
are collated; and as these are highly technical and professional, the civilians in 
charge have not attempted the work of collation. Having, however, for some 
years been a volunteer pioneer in these matters, perhaps I may be permitted for 
five minutes to give an outline of the results of my researches. 
First: with regard to Siege Artillery. This consisted of “ whole cannons” or 
“cannons of battery,” whole culverins, 12-pounders, mortars and hawbitzers 
(howitzers). These were all of English manufacture, as Marlborough would not 
employ foreign guns with British troops—preferring the sounder material that 
he got from England. The “cannons of battery” were to batter the walls of 
fortresses, and were what we would term “ 40-pounders”’; the ‘‘culverins ” or 
24-pounders cut out the portion battered for a breach; while the 12-pounders 
repressed sorties. 
Marlborough’s siege campaigns may be divided into two classes—those which 
were artillery sieges proper; and those which subsequently became engineer 
sieges, conducted alike by the artillery. Until Louis XIV. issued a decree— 
which was repeated by the Republic, and also by Napoleon—binding the governors 
of places to stand at least one assault, it was the custom, as soon as a practicable 
