GARRISON ARTILLERY WARFARE. 179 
from 3,000 to 1,500 yards; at “close range” within 1,500 yards, or 
the ships will “run past” the defenders’ fire when the real object of 
the attack is situated in rear of the defence and out of reach of the 
attack until the fire of the defenders is evaded. 
The attack at “long range ” would, as a rule, be for the purpose of 
dividing the attention of the defenders from the main attack proceeding 
elsewhere, or would be used for a bombardment pure and simple. 
In these cases the attackers will endeavour to do the greatest possible 
damage to the defences, with the least possible chance of injury to 
themselves. The attack will not be pushed home unless it becomes 
apparent that the object will not be gained without it, or the feebleness 
of the defence invites the attackers to do so, and convert their secondary 
attack into a real one. 
“ Medium range” would be used when greater accuracy is required, 
while the position of “close range’? would be taken up to enable the 
machine and quick-firing guns to keep down the infantry, quick-firing 
and machine-gun fire which would be used to repel a landing or attack 
by torpedo-boats. 
' A fortress, or a portion of it may possibly lend itself to a simultaneous 
attack at all these various ranges, combined with the phase of “ running 
past ;” but the probability of such a variety of attacks will depend en- 
tirely on local features. It will be evident therefore that the attackers 
must conform to more or less fixed rules, and that the nature of their 
operations and tactical dispositions will depend on the object they 
have in view and its importance. The strength and composition of 
the fleet, and the manner in which the attack is conducted will dis- 
close their object, even if the defenders have not previously received 
information of the departure of a fleet with some specific purpose, from 
the enemy’s shore. 
The tactical formations of the attackers will further be influenced 
julien 
(a) The nature of their armament and thickness of armour, and 
the natures ofthe guns of the fortress with their distribution, 
positions, and arcs of fire, in conjuction with the 3 and 5 
fathom lines and mine-fields. Generally speaking as we 
know all about the armament of ships as fast as they can 
be identified, so it may be imagined that the attackers know 
the numbers and natures of the guns opposed to them, their 
distribution and arcs of fire. The effect of the other con- 
sideration is obvious. A naval officer once remarked to me 
when I was talking to him on this subject, “ we should run 
in close and pour in a heavy fire from everything we have 
got to fire with. It would be all over in 15 minutes.” 
“Qne way or the other,” I suggested, and I cannot but 
think that his plan would not be universally successful in 
capturing a fortress. 
(b) The time at their disposal.—This consideration will only come 
into force when the attack is of the nature of a raid on the 
matériel or ships protected by the fortress, which must be 
