184. GARRISON ARTILLERY WARFARE. 
must’ move in one of these two ways, or after a similar fashion. 
From the fortress point of view, we should have a succession of ships 
passing through the ares of fire of the different works and groups. In 
that case as a general instruction we should open fire on the leader and 
follow her right through the arc; then pick up the next one entering 
the are and follow her through, and so onto the last ship, keeping each 
one under fire as long as she remains in the arc of the group and is not 
masked by the following ships. This would happen when they were 
circling in the are of fire of guns of low command. Should any 
particular ship become disabled the fire commander will specially order 
such guns as he may consider best for the work, to turn their fire on 
to her and complete her discomfiture. 
Thus we see that all through the fight up to “close ranges,” the 
defenders, owing to the tactics of the enemy, will be constantly chasing 
one objective after another, through their arcs of fire. Consequently 
the fewer the orders as to choice of objective issued by the I'.C. or 
section C.R.A. during the action, the better. A change of objective 
means a temporary cessation of fire, while identifying the new objective, 
so although such a change is occasionally imperative, yet as long as the 
ships he wishes to be attacked are receiving all the attention that the 
Fire Commander desires, he will do well, after the engagement has com- 
menced to allow the Battery Commanders to carry on against them as 
far as possible on lines fixed beforehand. Fixed lines, but not rigid 
ones. Any divergence should be regarded as a possible factor in 
the problem, and its effect only weighed and noted by the Fire 
Commander. Whether this divergence is due to imbecility or genius 
on the part of his subordinate ought 1o be well known to the former, 
and his action in the matter will depend on his knowledge of the 
offender’s idiosyncrasy. A well-timed, happily resulting fire might 
change the fortunes of the day, and it would be quite wrong for 
any subordinate, quick enough to appreciate an opportunity, not to 
take full advantage of it; although the necessary orders had not 
reached him. ‘The various links in the chain of command should be 
taught to consult their brain pans, and not the telephone. 
In answer to the question, will the shipsanchor? Isay, No! except 
at close range, and then only if, owing to their heavy armour they con- 
sider they are protected from the fire of the fortress or there be not 
sufficient sea-room at that range to admit of the manceuvres of the 
necessary number of ships itis considered desirable to bring into action 
there. 
As regards the identification of ships. It will be obvious that this 
will only be of importance in a “broadside” fight—(if I may use the 
term)—1.e., when the attackers are not exposed to plunging fire from 
guns on high sites, if will be unimportant when they are exposed to a 
“ deck” attack 7.e., when the personnel and unarmoured structures are 
under a plunging fire. 
The following points then appear to be requisite to enable a sea 
fortress to resist the “secondary ” attack of an opposing fleet :— 
(1.) Invisibility of armament, range-finding and other instal- 
lations. 
