THE BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ. 207 
Wischau and Brunn and the allies were waiting at Olschau for the 
reserve under Grand Duke Constantine. The Russian Hmperor 
had arrived, and his presence greatly encouraged the troops. The 
Austrian Emperor Francis was also present. The Reserve joined on 
25th November. 
The allied army now amounted to 90,000 men. Though close to Movements 
the French, they took no trouble to reconnoitre the positions of the ofallies. 
latter, and made an entirely wrong estimate of affairs. Their Chief of 
the Staff was Werrorumr, to whom Napotzon had been opposed on 
previous occasions with success. 
An allied council of war was held on the 27th, and it was decided 
to attack at once. On that day, therefore, the army advanced in five Allies takes 
columns with the intention of attacking the French left, and on the Wischau, 
28th it carried the French advanced post of Wischau. 
Believing now that the French meant to avoid a battle, and that and change 
Navo.eron’s line of retreat would be the Brunn-Vienna road, the allies te! plans. 
suddenly changed their plans and decided to turn the French right. 
They therefore forsook their line of retreat by Olmutz, and adopted a 
new one on Hungary. 
The allies continued their advance on the 29th. Bagration, with Allies’ 
the van-guard of the right wing, was to occupy Rausnitz, the rest of , Pare 
the army to move to the left and fall on the French right; if successful, i : 
to change front to the right and occupy the ground between Turas and 
Schlapanitz. The right wing was to co-operate in the general attack 
on the French after their right had been turned, and be connected © 
with the centre by Licurensrsin’s Cavalry ; they would then contain 
Navonzon on the Olmutz road while his right was again being turned, 
and thus, it was hoped, drive him into Bohemia. 
Meanwhile the occupation of Wischau by the allies decided NAPoLEON, Course 
who retired his advanced posts, ordered up Bernaporre and Davousr token 
to join him, and formed up his army between Turas and Latein. He en 
soon discovered the plan of the allies, and on the arrival of Bernaporrs 
and Davoust (who had made a forced march) he took his measures to 
meet the enemy. Naponron saw the value of the Pratzen heights, but did 
not occupy them, because he knew that this would only lead to a contest 
with equal chances ; he wished to strike a decisive blow, and therefore 
kept his army behind the Goldbach, merely leaving a detachment of 
cavalry on Pratzen. 
On the Ist December his army was in position, purposely left weak Position of 
on the right, and concentrated at the left and centre. The left wag French on 
on the Bohemian mountains and on the isolated hill of Santon, which oe eNE 
was strongly held. The front of the position followed the line of the 
Goldbach. The right rested on the deep ponds of Menitz and Satschan. See Map II 
The left wing under LaNnNEs consisted of-—- > Composi- 
Division Sucuer, 8 battns. (4 regts.)—south of Bellatitz. | vented 
3 CaFFARELLI, 10 battns. (5 regts.)—on right of Sucuer. force. 
17th Regiment, infantry. Left. 
f Under CLapparEDE— il 
18 Heavy guns (SéNARMON‘T), t C PAREDE-—on hill of Santon. 
8 Squadrons light cavalry on left flank watching Valley of the Dwaroschna. J 
