THE BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ. 215 
between the columns which extended over a great length of road. 
When making an oblique attack, as the allies did, the continuity of 
the line should be maintained throughout the advance, otherwise the 
flanks, which are the weak points of the line, are multiplied. 
(3.) The allies managed their artillery very badly; they had a antea 
superiority in that arm, but made no use of it. A large number of 
guns were left behind, and from the meagre accounts we have of the ‘ployed 
part played by the artillery, it would appear that they moved it in rear 
of the infantry, thereby hampering the action of the guns. When the 
artillery of the left wing was required to act, the guns could not be 
brought to bear upon the French until the latter had taken the allies 
in flank. The reserve was weak and engaged in the front line, when Reserve 
repulsed there was no further support to fall back on. ditto. 
(4.) The allies had their left flank resting on the ponds of Menitz 
and Satschan. When the centre was broken all the intervening troops 
were rolled back into this flank and destroyed. 
If now, on the other hand, we consider the plan and tactics adopted Reasons for 
by the French, we find that Naprozson succeeded in deceiving his erence 
enemies, and actually managed to make them fall in with his scheme. j 
He selected a central position and concentrated his troops there unseen 
by the allies, and ready to fall on their centre as soon as he gave the 
word. When his troops did advance he saw that they were properly 
supported and kept perfect touch between the different parts. He 
really possessed a defensive position and the allies an offensive one, 
but, as it turned out, this order of things was actually reversed. 
His new formation for attack was eminently successful and specially 
adapted to overthrow the line formation. In it the action of the 
three arms was combined to the greatest advantage. He could readily Advan- 
form front to a flank, each portion was independent and could act as a tagesofnew 
reserve to the other. ‘The general had his divisions well under control, ieee 
owing to the length of front being not more than 800 yards. Naporzon, 
while directing and planning the whole of the arrangements for the Tudepere 
attack, gave his generals commanding corps the power of using their dent action 
own discretion as to how they advanced on the different natures of allowed ye 
f iefs of 
grounds. Thus we see Soutt, Lannes and Brernaports, though em- © corps. 
ploying practically the same system of tactics, advancing nevertheless 
in different formations suited to the ground. Napo.zon employed 
skirmishers, and doubtless with advantage. Though the enemy might Skirmish- 
harass the flanks of his infantry with their cavalry (as in Lannes’ Case) amr pou 
his cavalry, which was in rear of the centre of the brigade, could pro- fee 
tect the infantry, and, when occasion offered, it could advance through ae 
the intervals and pursue. We find, on the other hand, that the allies 
used their cavalry in the first line and trusted to it to fill gaps. Did it 
succeed in piercing the front line of the French, it was met bya steady 
fire from the second line which formed battalion squares. 
The French guns, well protected by their position in the front line, French 
co-operated in the force of the attack by reserving their fire until at ™tillery. 
close ranges when it must be effective; they also took up good 
positions. 
