ARTILLERY FROM AN INFANTRY OFFICER’S POINT OF VIEW. 265 
before the assault to send forward a few batteries into the foremost 
line. This procedure is also admissable in the defence to defeat the 
hostile attack. The moral effect of artillery in these circumstances 
will be very great. In these cases we may consider the hostile infantry 
as thoroughly shaken, and with shaken infantry one may dare to take 
liberties.” But I must adhere to what I have said and I haye never 
seen this done at manceuvres. 
There are no hard and fast rules regarding tactics in Germany. 
Ground cannot be altered and formations can, and that formation is 
considered best which is best adapted to the actual ground and to the 
circumstances of the individual case. In conformity with this prin- 
ciple attack formations for infantry are never allowed to be practised. 
A general officer, whose opinion on tactical matters is highly valued, 
and with whom I have had the advantage of very many long talks, 
once said to me, “TI divide commanders into two: Firstly, those who 
devise attack formations and apply them to the ground whatever it 
may be. Secondly, those who take the ground as it is, and who can 
on the spot make the best use of it. ‘The former I do my best to rid 
the. service of, the latter are my men.’ ”’ 
Before leaving the subject of ground I should like to remark on the 
manner in which the Germans prepare positions for defence, but do 
not occupy them until the enemy has definitely shown his hand. 
Nothing is blamed more than a too early deployment either in attack 
or in defence. Let me quote the following example of what I mean. 
On the last day of the manoeuvres at which I was last year present the 
division with to which I had attached myself had received warning over 
night that it would probably be attacked next morning by a much 
superior force, and that it could not expect reinforcements until mid- 
day. It had consequently taken up a defensive position, shelter 
trenches were dug and gun-pits thrown up behind them. Three 
artillery positions were prepared, one facing S.E., one S. and one 
S.W. ‘There were only two brigade divisions, 7.e. sufficient batteries 
to occupy two out of the three positions prepared. Only a very thin 
line of infantry was thrown into the trenches, just enough to prevent 
inquisitive hostile cavalry coming up too near, and the whole of the 
rest of the force was kept in reserve under cover. Officers com- 
manding sections in the line of defence receiving most definite orders 
not to occupy any part of the line in force, until it was beyond doubt 
that the enemy meant to attack it. There was excellent cover, a quarter 
to half a mile, behind the trenches. 
Later on this same day it became evident that the enemy had 20 
batteries and four infantry brigades, whereas the defending force con- 
sisted of six batteries and two infantry brigades. I asked the officer 
commanding the defence how long he thought he could hold out until 
support came. He said, “the mist to-day helps me, but on a clear 
day I could not hold out more than two hours in the face of the 
enemy’s superior artillery fire,’ and turning to the officer com- 
manding artillery, he asked him his opinion. He said, “I think, 
sir, you have over stated the time, I would not give you more than iy 
