ARTILLERY FROM AN INFANTRY OFFICER’S POINT OF VIEW. 269 
within 1200 yards of them and retreating from position to position, 
hardly exposing themselves to fire and always, when in action, keeping 
‘their horses under cover. It is considered that in a delaying action 
infantry should never allow hostile infantry to get within 600 yards of 
them, for that if they do so they will find it impossible to withdraw. 
The key-note of the whole German army and the secret of its 
efficiency is decentralization. This begins from the bottom aud works 
up. From the day an officer joins he is accustomed to responsibility. 
Commanders of squadrons, batteries and companies are practically in- 
dependent, their immediate superiors may inspect them, but are 
forbidden to lay down what parades they shall hold. At manceuvres 
I have never seen any interference on the part of battalion or regi- 
mental commanders with their subordinates, a man receive his orders 
and he is allowed to carry them out his own way. An officer is often 
asked afterwards why he did so-and-so, and is either praised or blamed 
for his correct or false appreciation of the situation. It isacknowledged 
that in war a company once committed to action is like an arrow from 
a bow which can only be gathered when the ground over which it was 
‘sent has been won. It is acknowledged that the only way of sending 
up orders to the firing line will be through reinforcements and when 
a company is once committed to action the commander is independent. 
If an officer is found to be unfit for his responsible position, and 
every post carries with it a great deal of responsibility, he is retired 
with a small pension, and this is a matter of every day occurrence, a 
great number of compulsory retirements taking place in the lower 
ranks. 
This system of decentralization immensely lightens office work. 
There are two staff officers to a division, each of whom does on an 
average two hours office work a day, for hardly anything gets as far 
as the divisional office and still less goes past it. But to return to the 
subject of my lecture from which I fear I have diverged. 
There are one or two points on which I should—if f am not delaying 
you too long—like to say a word or two. 
It is a disputed point at what distance infantry on an equal front 
will be able to get the better of artillery and the following results of 
firing at long ranges may be of interest. At Meean Meer at 1900 
yards at two targets, each 8’ x 12’, 1360 rounds were fired, these 
rounds could have been fired comfortably in four minutes by 100 men, 
there were five hits, that is 386°/,. At Karachi at 13800 yards at a 
target representing five guns,20 gunners and also two screens 2’ x 12’, 
representing an escort, 620 rounds were fired, there were 15 hits, 7.e. 
2°42 per cent., this would represent the fire of 100 men for two 
minutes. 
I should like to quote the opinion of a distinguished German officer 
on this subject in writing to me, he says: “ We are of opinion that at 
1100 yards and at all nearer distances infantry will get the better of 
artillery, if both open fire simultaneously, and that they will gain the 
upper hand even if the artillery are able to provide cover for their 
men up. to-their waists. It is only when ground is so formed that 
