Chain of 
connection 
between 
army and 
depots, 
314 SILVER MEDAL PRIZE Essay, 1896. 
tenes for long without being re-supplied from the base or intermediate 
epots. 
The idea of the chain of Column and Park connecting fighting line 
with the base is that the links in rear should fill up the link in its 
immediate front, the rear link recouping itself from the base. 
The losses of the German artillery at Colombey, Mars-la-Tour and 
Gravelotte would seem to offer a very fair criterion to judge of the 
losses in material and personnel which must be made good by Columns 
and Parks. It would be difficult to imagine a case where these units 
would be required to do more without being filled up from the base. 
Major Stone gives the following statistics ve losses in material. 
| 1 2 3 
Q Maxima in any one | Averages for the three | Totals for the three 
Material. battle. battles. battles. 
Gun Carriages ... ...{L per 26 Batteries at/i per 44°5 Batteries. 1 per 15 Batteries. 
Colombey. 
Wheels ... 5o0 ...|L per 3 Batteries at Mars-|1 per 15 Batteries. 1 per 5 Batteries. 
la-Tour. 
IRAE cop 900 ...|1 per 6 Batteries at Mars-|1 per 21 Batteries. 1 per 7 Batteries. 
la-Tour. 
This table at once shows that an allowance of one spare gun-carriage 
per Ammunition Column will be very ample even in case of the five 
batteries depending on the Corps Troops Column. 
As every battery carries spare wheels, and we see that 1 per 3 
batteries was the maximum, it will be ample if every Royal Artillery 
ammunition wagon in the Column carries a spare wheel and every 
other one in the Cavalry Column (vide tables of Columns and Parks). 
In the event of the loss of a wagon by explosion the Column would 
have to supply it, taking an ammunition-and-store wagon from the 
Park till another one could come up from the base. The loss in poles 
was so trifling that the spare shafts or polesif carried by Columns in the 
same proportion as by batteries would be ample. Major Stone’s words, 
on page 588 of the R.A.I. “ Proceedings,” may well be taken as they 
stand on the subject of losses to material. He answers the argument, 
that as the losses to material from shell-fire are always insignificant, the 
losses to wheels and shafts would be much higher in an arduous march 
over bad country. That in battles like Mars-la-Tour, or Gravelotte, 
by saying— 
1. “In battles like these, the rough cross-country work on the 
field of battle is an infinitely greater strain than the 
most trying march along the worst roads. 
2. Experience has shewn that our material is so excellent that 
the roughest marches can be successfully performed 
with little or no damage to wheels. As an instance, 
we may recall the march of 1 Battery Royal Horse 
Artillery, 8 Batteries Field and 2 Batteries Heavy 
Field Artillery from the Indus to Kandahar without 
the loss of a wheel. This is probably the most severe 
march that a mixed artillery force has ever been called 
upon to undertake.” 
