2 
attention to the matter. It is to be regretted that the French General Staff has 
not yet seen its way to give us an account of the wars of Napoleon based on the 
original documents stored away in the archives of the War Office. When this is 
done, a most valuable addition will be made to our military knowledge. 
Thus it comes about, as we have said, that the large strategic operations in this 
war presents special attractions to the student, and none of them will prove more 
interesting (if we except Napoleon’s compaign in the winter of 1808-09, and - 
Massena’s advance against the lines of Torres Vedras) than the four offensive 
campaigns which the English undertook. The first and last of these, the most 
skilfully conducted as far as strategy is concerned, were directed against the 
Bayonne—Burgos Road, the narrow channel through which flowed the stream of 
supply that fed the French armies, and the most vital point at which the invaders 
might be struck. The goal, on the other hand, which Wellington had in view 
during his second and third campaigns—those which we propose now to discuss 
—was Madrid, the capital of his opponent’s country; and in them his enterprise 
was foiled in both instances by the inventive mind of Soult. 
When the Spanish standing army had been shattered, and the new government 
firmly established, Napoleon returned to France. This was at the end of January 
1809, and the forces he left in the Peninsula stood at that time divided into four 
groups. To the Hastern army was assigned the subjugation of Arragon and 
Catalonia, and, on that task being accomplished, the conquest of the kingdom of 
Valencia. A Northern army was to overawe the provinces of Gallicia and 
Asturias, which had already been occupied. The operations of these two armies, 
even if not of a precisely similar nature, were nevertheless of only secondary im- 
portance, and we may at present leave them outside the sphere of our considerations. 
As regards the two other armies, that of the South, under Marshal Victor, lay at 
Almaraz on the Tagus, while the Western one, under Marshal Soult, was posted 
at Santiago, on the northern boundary of Portugal. 
On the side of their opponents the opposition government of Spain had estab- 
lished itself afresh at Seville, and was engaged in organizing the fighting strength 
of the Southern provinces for further resistance. Meanwhile, however vast the 
devotion and self sacrifice might prove to which patriotism could nerve the 
Spanish people, months must necessarily elapse ere the new organizations, which 
it was intended to create, could be led into the field in anything like a state of 
tuilitary efficiency. Moreover the recent victorious campaign of Napoleon had 
very powerfully impressed the government, parliament, and people of England, 
Men could not altogether put away the idea that it would be wiser to call home 
the British army which held Lisbon, and leave the Peninsula to its fate. Even 
at the beginning of March the government called the special attention of Wellington 
to this project. ‘The directions which Napoleon left behind him were intended to 
deal with this state of things. 
For the armies of the West and of the South the following objectives were 
indicated. Both were to operate at the same moment against the centres of 
hostile resistance, and-were to march for Lisbon and Seville respectively in the 
middle of February. It was calculated that the desired marches would be 
accomplished at the end of March, and that then the two armies would be in 
communication with one another vwi@ Badajoz. 
The principal line of operations therefore for the Western army, Soult’s, which 
consisted of four infantry and two cavalry divisions, and according to the some- 
what exaggerated estimate of the Emperor, had a strength of 36,000 men, was the 
road Santiago, Oporto, Coimbra, Lisbon, running along the sea coast. The 
distance it had to traverse was, as the crow flies, 65 miles,! or thirty easy days’ 
marches. If we throw in ten days for rest it will be seen that the time, from the 
1 A German mile equals 3°89 English ones. 
