3 
middle of February to the end of March, allowed for the operation was ample. 
No hostile resistance was anticipated. The enemy had indeed no army in the 
field ; and the most that was expected was that the English army might be met 
with at Lisbon, if indeed the islanders still ventured to try and establish them- 
selves in Portugal. In accordance with these instructions, Soult’s army began its 
forward movement on the 15th of February, but almost immediately began to 
encounter considerable obstacles due to the incredibly bad state of the roads and 
the growing hostility of the population. 
Thus it was found that the Portuguese had destroyed all the bridges over the 
lower Minho. In order to get across the river, therefore Soult, who with charac- 
teristic carelessness had marched without a pontoon train, had to move for 15 
miles up one bank, and again 15 miles down the other. In other words he had 
to go some 80 miles out of his way. When at length his army had, after this 
expedition, reached the direct road, and was moving to the attack of Oporto with 
the object of there securing a passage across the Douro, it was met by the news 
that the town had been entrenched and was garrisoned by a strong Portuguese 
force. By the exertions of the clergy a considerable army of militia had indeed 
been got together, and the Bishop of Oporto placed himself at its head. Soult 
without hesitation determined to attack, and on the 29th of March gained an easy 
victory over his more or less untrained opponents. In vain did the Portuguese 
fight with the most praiseworthy courage. In vain did the fighting Bishop, clad 
in all his vestments, lead the fanatical peasants to the onset—a drawn sword in 
one hand and a crucifix in the other. The determined bayonet charge of the 
French battalion columns at the first rush completely routed the undisciplined 
mob before them. The battle ended after a few hours fighting in the capture of 
the entrenchments, the dispersion of the Portuguese army, and the occupation of 
the town. 
' French accounts give the Portuguese strength at 60,000 men, and place their 
loss at from 8000 to 9000 men, and 200 guns, while they do not admit on their side 
more than between 300 and 4.00 hors de combat. These estimates, as far at least 
as the Portuguese are concerned, are probably exaggerated, but it has not been 
found possible to verify them by Portuguese returns. 
The immediate result of this victory was the subjugation of the north of 
Portugal, but so many detachments had to be sent away from the French army 
to hold the country and preserve the communication with the rear, that Soult was 
compelled at once to call a halt. 
Meanwhile the Southern army, which was to co-operate with him, had been 
similarly involved in endless combats with the Spanish militia ; it had however at 
length veached Medellin on the Guadiana, and had endeavoured to obtain news 
as to the whereabouts of the army of the west, with the object of estab- 
lishing the desired communication with it by way of Badajoz. Its efforts however 
in this direction were practically fruitless, and therefore this army too, in place 
of marching to the Guadalquiver, came to a standstill, and remained for two 
months halted on the Guadiana. During the whole of this period the guerrillas 
had so completely interrupted communications between the armies of Ney and 
Soult with France, Madrid, and the army of the South, that the French leaders were 
forced to seek news of what was going on from the doubtful channel of smuggled 
English newspapers. These made the situation of Napoleon, on the banks of the 
Danube—they were the days of Regensburg—appear by no means satisfactory. 
In spite of the victory he had gained, Marshal Soult had therefore failed to 
carry out the project assigned to him. At the end of March, when he should 
have been in front of Lisbon, he was still only at Oporto. He now determined 
to still further neglect his instructions, and to wait ere he pressed on towards 
Lisbon until he had secured a safe base of operations for himself in the north 
6A 
