6 
following additional paragraph. “‘ Wellesley will probably advance along the 
Tagus to’ Madrid; in which case do you cross the mountains, fall on his flank 
and rear, and destroy him.” No such paragraph appears in the correspondence 
of Napoleon ; whether it be apocryphal, or whether it has been purposely omitted, 
I cannot say. 
To judge fairly Soult’s marching arrangements, we must take in view the 
operations which Wellesley might possibly and reasonably enter upon. 
“ The Lord” might repeat the manceuvre which his countrymen had already 
once before undertaken, embark his army, land at Corunna or Ferrol, and from 
thence advance against Burgos vid Astorga. Or he might push forward on the 
great road Coimbra, Salamanca, Valladolid. Or, finally, he might move through 
Alcantara on Madrid. 
Soult now moved his 50,000 men on the line Astorga, Zamora, Salamanca. That 
is doubtless a front of 20 miles,! but he could concentrate his army nevertheless 
on one flank in from 8 to 10 days. Wellesley would therefore find him across his 
- path if he adopted either of the first named plans, while, should he make for 
Madrid vid Alcantara, he would expose his flank and rear to an attack of Soult 
from the direction of Plasencia, such as Nopoleon had suggested. 
Soult therefore may be said to have so far acted in accordance with what the 
situation demanded. 
King Joseph on his side had again taken the Southern army from the Guadiana 
to the Tagus on the line Talavera—Toledo. It accordingly formed in combination 
with the guard, which stood at Madrid, a second principal group of 50,000 men. 
It is exceedingly interesting at this point to note how differently the various 
French generals read the intention of their adversary. 
Soult, to begin with, does not believe in any English offensive at all. He con- 
siders that the summer months will be too hot for any such operations, and in the 
autumn he intends himself to be the aggressor. He explains his ideas and views 
in a carefully thought out memorandum which he handed in to King Joseph. 
The head-quarter staff of King Joseph at Madrid, wavered as usual between 
this policy and that, and at one moment believed in one possibility, and then again 
in another. In such uncertainty of mind action was forgotten, and finally the 
event came as a surprise. The Emperor alone, though far from the scene of 
action, made the correct forecast. On the 22nd of June he dictated to Berthier 
as follows: ‘It seems that the English are strengthening their position in 
Portugal; it is from there that misfortune will come upon us, if they do not lay 
their plans well in Madrid.” And again on the 8th of July he speaks even more 
plainly. ‘‘ Write to Madrid and tell them that a disastrous blow will come from 
the Englishmen, if they do not manage their affairs better there; I tremble when 
T think how the Englishmen breaking out of Portugal by Abrantes may surprise 
the King in Madrid by their movements, which will be kept quite secret with that 
end in view.” 
And what the Emperor prognosticated was what really occurred. Wellesley 
moved forward by Alcantara, joined himself on at Almaraz to part of the Spanish 
army, and entered Talavera on the 22nd of July with 60,000 men, while the re- 
mainder of the Spanish army, still 20,000 strong, under Venegas, advanced by 
Aranjuez on Madrid. The strategical situation which was thus brought about is 
one of the most interesting of the whole Peninsular war. 
The army on the French right flank, 50,000 strong, was echelonned along the 
road Salamanca—Astorga, with its head at the latter place. That on the left 
under King Joseph of about equal strength was at and round Madrid. Wellesley 
found himself with 60,000 men at Talavera between these two bodies, and again 
1 German. 
