8 
this one, took place in the summer of 1812. During the three years, which lay 
between the first and third offensive, the French had completed the capture of 
Spain, while the English had asserted their superiority in Portugal. 
We must remember that in the spring of 1812 a change in the foreign policy 
of Napoleon took place and that the campaign in Russia was already looming in 
the distance. The Emperor therefore determined to act on the defensive in Spain 
so as to be able to withdraw at any rate some of his troops from the Peninsula, 
and turn them to account in the coming expedition. In accordance with this 
resolution the young guard, the Polish division, twelve regiments of dragoons, 
and some fourth battalions, in all about 25,000 of his best troops, marched out 
of Spain. 
The corps which remained were distributed as follows—again leaving out of 
sight the force in Hastern Spain. 
A weak Northern army was placed in Asturias and Biscaya, a strong Western 
army under Marmont at Salamanca. To it the Emperor had assigned the duty 
of protecting the line of communication, Bayonne, Burgos, Madrid, and under 
certain circumstances the capital itself also. There King Joseph was to be found 
at the head of a weak central force, while Soult was in front of Cadiz with the 
strong army of the South. Napoleon had impressed on his brother the necessity 
for giving way, in order to ensure co-operation between the Western and Southern 
armies, in case of possible English advance, and had indicated that, in order to 
gain this object, it might become necessary to evacuate Southern Spain. 
The English General had rightly judged the course of events. All that he had 
for years past foreseen and prognosticated was now about to occur. The French 
army, once so proud and invincible, had been shaken to its inmost parts by long 
long years of guerrilla warfare, it had fallen away in numbers, and now stood 
scattered over a wide area. The Duke! therefore did not hesitate to take advan- 
tage of the chance the situation offered to him, and begin a counter attack. On 
the very day when Napoleon started for the Niemen the English army was to be 
found again on the road they had so often traversed to the North of Portugal. 
But in order to sever the North and South of Spain from one another, 
Wellington conceived a daring enterprise, which was carried out by his most 
skilful lieutenant, General Hill, with a bravery equal to the ingenuity of the 
design. 
The main road from Madrid to Cadiz runs through Almaraz over the Tagus. 
Marmont had fortified the passage by constructing two bridge heads which he 
named, in honour of his master and of himself, forts Napoleon and Ragusa. Hill 
got across the mountain range on the road by Truxillo to Almaraz with masterly 
secrecy, and assaulted fort Napoleon in the grey dawn after a night march. The 
French outposts did not discover their assailants until their columns with the 
storming ladders were within a hundred yards of the walls. A short struggle 
ensued, and then the weak garrison broke into headlong flight, abandoning not 
only the bridge but fort Ragusa on the opposite side also to their opponents. 
General Hill caused the works to be razed to the ground, blew up the bridges, 
and then marched back by Alcantara to Portugal with the same rapidity with 
which he had appeared. 
While this bold enterprise, which completely broke off connection between the 
French armies, was being carried through, Wellington reached Almeida and began 
the offensive against Marmont. In vain did the Marshal appeal to Madrid and 
Asturias for help. The Northern and Central armies did indeed advance to his 
assistance, but they reached him too late; the decisive blow had been struck. 
On the 22nd of July Marmont had allowed himself to be deceived by a pretended 
retreat on the part of Wellington, and had assailed an adversary not only stronger 
1 The German author here anticipates a little, for Wellington was not yet a duke.—E.8.M, 
