10 
was the one adopted. He recommended that the Hastern army should remain in 
Valencia, while those of the South and Centre, in all about 60,000 men, should 
march on Aranjuez and attack Wellington. Should they find that he had moved 
on Burgos, they might press on after him towards Valladolid and compe! him to 
give battle with an inverted front. 
On the 30th of September both the armies, which had accomplished marches of 
80 and 50 miles respectively during the last month, started on the path which 
was eventually to lead them right through Spain, and what hardships did not the 
crossing of the Sierra Morena involve? A German officer who was with the 
army of the South writes of these marches :—‘ Imagine an army with all its 
guns and baggage moving on an indifferent foothpath. (for a road is out of the 
question altogether) and one can form some idea of the difficulty of the task set 
to the troops. A narrow path which had hitherto only been used for mules had 
now to be rendered fit for carriages. The corps of engineers struggled against 
incredible obstacles, often having to blow away huge masses of Oo, cit) their 
labours were accomplished. Cireumstances were such that it was impossible to 
avoid danger at certain places. Wheels of guns often grazed the edges of terrify- 
ing precipices, or of crazy bridges over yawning chasms, swaying under their 
weight, and threatening every moment to give way and launch their loads into the 
unseen depths below.” 
In spite, however, of all such obstacles the army reached Aranjuez on the 
Tagus as early as the 29th of October. 
Ww ellington had not expected such an operation. He had spent three weeks in 
Madrid amusing himself with festivities, illuminations, and bull fights, and had 
then marched with his army by Valladolid on Burgos in order to follow up his 
victory over the army of the North. 
When the English turned towards Madrid after Salamanca this force had ad- 
vanced again to the Douro, but when Wellington now again advanced upon it it 
fell slowly back on Burgos. Its leader, General Souham, determined to await the 
arrival of Soult in this strong position, and not to give his adversary a chance 
against him. With this end in view, therefore, he fortified Burgos, which was 
well situated for such an object, barred the road, by means of field entrenchments, 
garrisoned the works strongly, and placed himself with the army in position 
at Briviesca, about five miles on the north-east of Burgos. 
Wellington in place of going round the well fortified rear-guard position and 
assailing the « army, commenced to lay a regular siege to the town. But now the 
fortune of war deserted him. The successful defence of Burgos under General 
Dupreton, which lasted for a whole month, has a place among st the most brilliant 
feats of arms which are recorded of the Peninsular war. After Wellington had 
vainly stormed the town three times, and in so doing had lost 92 officers and 2000 
men, he received news of Soult’s march to the Tagus, and felt compelled to raise 
the siege and fall back slowly across the Douro to Salamanca: Souham followed 
him immediately, and Soult redoubled his forced marches in order to try and cut 
the English off from Portugal. But unfortunately for the French his efforts were 
in vain, He was too late, even if so by two days only. 
On the 8th of November Wellington reached his strong position on the Arapiles, 
where three months and a half before he had won his celebrated victory ; and was 
then secure of his retreat. On the 10th the two French bodies of troops united 
together, but before in place of behind him. Yet Soult still hoped to compel 
his pr udent adversar y to fight on an inverted front. The French army therefore 
drew its strength together on its left, crossed the river at and above Alba de 
Tormes, and on the 14th moved in heavy masses towards the Salamanca-Ciudad 
Rodrigo road, along which ran the English communications to the rear. But 
Wellington gained information as to his intentions in the nick of time, and under 
