il 
cover of a heavy mist, which shrouded the low ground near the Tormes, succeeded 
in marching away, and once more eluded the grasp of the French. 
On the 18th of November he again reached Ciudad Rodrigo, and the security 
of Portuguese soil. But Spain was once more in the hands of the French. 
These two campaigns, whose leading features I have thus tried to sketch, called 
forth the liveliest contemporary interest, and most distinguished men have left us 
their views about them. The operations of Wellington have been favourably 
criticised as regards their execution, but show no trace of the highest genius. 
Indeed it is these very operations and those which preceded the battle of Waterloo 
which caused contemporaries and later generations to come to the decision that 
the English commander came just short of that stature by which great leaders 
tower over average generals. 
In both campaigns Wellington enjoyed the advantage of interior lines. At 
Talavera he stood between the two hostile groups of his opponents in Plasencia 
and Madrid, just as three years later he found himself between Burgos and Murcia. 
But criticism exacts signs of the very highest genius for war from those who 
would carry out operations on interior lines successfully. For it is here not only 
a matter of sound calculation as to time and space. A quick appreciation of the 
situation, keen enterprise, rapid, energetic action, and the greatest personal in- 
fluence, are demanded from him who is in command. His personal characteristics 
now come prominently into the foreground. And the tool he handles, his army, 
must also be well adapted both for marching and fighting. The operations of 
Frederick the Great between Rossbach and Leuthen and those of Napoleon in 
1814 are justly considered the most brilliant examples of their strategy, while 
the tasks accomplished by their men form the most distinguished episodes of 
Prussian and French military history. During the campaign of 1886 the Austrian 
army of Benedek likewise stood on interior lines from the 27th to the 30th of 
June, but Benedek did not fully utilize the time at his disposal, and on the Ist 
of July the situation had alreddy so completely altered that the advantage of the 
interior lines had been transformed into the disadvantage of being tactically closed 
in, and that the defeat of Koniggratz was almost a foregone conclusion. 
Criticism has not failed it is true to extend respect and heartfelt sympathy to 
Benedek and his brave troops, but it has at the same time denied to him the title 
of a great general. 
Lord Wellington now holds a position midway between Frederick the Great 
and Napoleon on the one side and Benedek on the other. His biographer says of 
him. ‘No general ever left less to chance. It was his conviction that in military 
matters, as in life generally, success is more surely attained by a methodical 
attention to rules than by any sudden inspirations or extraordinary combination 
of favourable circumstances. Although he was not lacking in either resolution or 
bravery, nay even if his character rather spurred him on to bold strokes, yet his 
reason urged him to go along the slower but surer road which experience pointed 
out.” 
Wellington like Benedek did not utilize time, of which, especially in 1812, he 
had plenty, as he might have done, but he escaped from the difficulties thus en- 
gendered by a timely retreat. Yet in spite of tactical victory he was strategically 
beaten in both campaigns. 
In the year 1809 it is certainly the case that the main blame must rest on the 
troops he led, and therefore this campaign is measured, at any rate, by the 
English, according to a less exacting standard. The army which conquered at 
Talavera, or perhaps, to speak more correctly, there repulsed the enemy’s attack, 
was composed half of Anglo-Portuguese troops, and half of Spanish. The 
Spaniards failed to fight altogether, and of the remainder a good fifth lay 
dead or wounded on the field. Strictly speaking Talavera was an undecided 
6B 
