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occasionally feared him, for the ambitious, clever, and unmannerly Marshal had 
dared to oppose his Lord and Master, and to propose terms to him. In spite of 
that, or even perhaps on account of it, Napoleon valued the General highly, and 
the judge, who was usually so severe, very seldom addressed the language of 
blame to Soult, not even after his adventure in North Lusitania. It is true, 
certainly, that blame in Napoleon’s mouth would here have sounded like mockery, 
for he himself had often boasted that he found his crown lying on the road side, 
and had picked it up with the point of his sword. But the highest token of his 
appreciation was given by the Emperor when he selected the Duke of Dalmatia to 
be his chief of the staff in 1815 in the place of the unfaithful Berthier. 
It is this Marshal forsooth that Thiers holds responsible for the defeat of 
Talavera, this man who succeeded in converting that disastrous event into a 
strategical victory. With what justice let us now see. 
To mancwuvre two separated groups, so that they shall combine to bring about 
a tactical crisis in front and rear of your opponent demands an even nicer 
calculation of time and space than do operations on interior lines, and the marching 
powers of your men must equal your skill in calculation. 
When King Joseph attacked Wellington at Talavera on the 28th of July, he 
counted on Soult’s having reached Plasencia on the 30th of July. The calculation 
was wrong by five days. A measurement of the distance on the map will show 
this. And such was the view taken by the Emperor. He has written on this 
point as follows.1 “It was quite evident that Marshal Soult could not arrive at 
Plasencia before the 4th of August, because he would not be likely to make the 
error of marching without the 6th Corps, which could not do the distance from 
Astorga sooner.” 
Thiers of course asserts—and he bases his statement, he tells us, on the memoirs 
of Jourdan and the correspondence of the Marshals—that General Foy on his 
return from Salamanca had repeatedly said that Soult would reach Plasencia on 
the 30th of July. That may very likely be so. But, even sv, how would it 
justify King Joseph in attacking at Talavera on the 28th? Soult had particularly 
begged him not only to avoid a decisive action until he was at Plasencia, but to 
avoid one until his march to that place had compelled the English to turn round, 
that is to say, until the strategic movement had asserted its influence tactically. 
When during the mid-day hours of the 8rd of July, 1866 the advance of the 
2nd Prussian army came to a standstill opposite the position of Chlum, the eyes 
of the head-quarter staff were turned with anxious expectation towards Horenowes, 
from whence too in due time the army of the Crown Prince entered into the 
struggle. In this case the calculations as to*time and space were sound. But 
such was not the case at Talavera. It is 20 miles from Plasencia to Talavera, 
or, supposing that Soult’s army made great efforts, four days march. It could 
not therefore be expected to fall on the rear of the English before the 8rd of 
August, even if it left Plasencia on the 30th of July. Joseph’s attack, entered 
upon, be it noted, against the advice of his staff, was therefore premature by 5 
days, and Soult is clearly not to be blamed for the resulting defeat. 
Another question is opened when we consider whether it would not have been 
better policy for the French to have altogether abandoned the idea of operating 
on two lines, and to have endeavoured to have united their forces for a decisive 
battle. Such a contest would then have assumed the form of a frontal attack on 
their part in lieu of the more promising encircling operations. Thiers says it 
would, and quotes the criticism of Napoleon on Jourdan and Joseph. But the 
censure he refers to is only to be understood if the personal capabilities of J oseph 
are kept inview. The Emperor so thoroughly appreciated the difficulties attending 
an attempt to completely surround an adversary, an operation which he had him- 
+ To Clarke, Schénbrunn, August 21st, 1809. 
