14 
self often carried out, that he could not. but fear lest the necessary movements, 
when under the guidance of his brother, might miscarry. 
Subsequently in a letter to his stepson Eugene when discussing a similar 
situation, he thus speaks of operations against an enemy’s communications. “A 
manoeuvre which I indicate, that I do not recommend, but which I myself would 
carry out, would be ——;” and again further on, ‘‘ but I do not recommend 
the bold maneeuvre to you. That is my manner, and for it one must thoroughly 
understand all the details and methods of procedure ; the object which is in view, 
and the blows which must be struck.” 
For the average general therefore these manceuvres are too complicated and too 
dangerous ; but his most skilful Marshal might surely permit himself to make war 
in the manner of the great Emperor? A letter to Soult of the 20th September, 
1809, written therefore when Napoleon had been thoroughly posted up in all the 
operations both before and after Talavera, illustrates this. It begins with the 
words, ‘‘I was dissatisfied with your conduct,” then follows a sharp and searching 
criticism of the operations at Oporto, of the retreat to Orense, which had resulted 
in the loss of the artillery and train, and then he says: “I forget what has 
occurred, I hope that it will be a lesson to you, and I entrust you with the post 
of Major-General of my forces in Spain. The King is without experience in war, 
and it is my desire that you should be responsible to me for the events of the 
war.” 
There is no hint therefore of blame for the march to Plasencia. 
We have a very similar example in modern military history. When, on the 
19th of January, 1871, General von Manteuffel determined to give up direct 
communication with General von Werder in order to lay himself in front of 
his opponent and cut him off from his line of retreat to French territory, Count 
Moeltke told his Majesty the Emperor that General Manteuffel’s operations were 
too bold and enterprising, but that they might nevertheless lead to great results. 
If he were to meet with a reverse he should not be blamed, for in order to arrive 
at great results something must be set at stake. 
When recording the operations in the autumn of 1812, Thiers has again only 
unfavourable criticism for Marshal Soult. 
He will not even give him credit for conceiving the project of the decisive 
march, but bestows it on Jourdan because he had recommended the movement 
from Murcia by Guadalaxara and Calatajud on the Ebro and up that river to 
Burgos. But such was not Soult’s conception at all. The plan suggested by 
Jourdan had for its object the union of the two French bodies of troops at 
Burgos, and a subsequent frontal*attack by them; that of Soult’s movement on 
Valladolid was, as in 1809, the hemming in of the enemy. 
The marching powers of Soult’s troops were in both campaigns strikingly ex- 
hibited. The distances between the beginnings and endings of their marches are 
as great as those which separate Berlin from Metz and Mainz. The army, or at 
any rate portions of it as strong as an army corps, covered in 1809 distances of 
60 miles in 14 days, and in 1812, of 80 miles in 22 days, which shows an average 
of 84 miles! per day. Moreover we have to remember that these distances are 
measured as the crow flies, and that in both cases lofty mountain ranges had to be 
traversed. 
These two campaigns of Soult’s supply us therefore both in conception and 
execution not only with a most interesting parallel in military history, but form 
turning points in the ever-changing course of the great war of independence. 
They were unmistakably decisive as regards the possession of Spain by the 
French. 
The Emperor Napoleon, when he began his operations on the Elbe in 1813, 
1 Seep. 2. 
