Unin- 
terrupted 
supply. 
2 
true if other and more weighty causes did not act in the opposite direction. It 
will be useful to consider this. 
At the present day the artillery duel—a strugele to the death between the 
batteries on either side—-is an accepted feature of future battles. This duel will 
entail a very large expenditure of ammunition—it will not last long, but the fire 
will be very severe. 
The power of firing from behind crests of hills—a result of improved matériel 
—will oblige both sides to take advantage of cover and the zone of ground it 
will be necessary to search with fire may be very deep, so that to produce the 
same effect a much larger number of rounds will be required than might be 
inferred from practice against visible targets on the practice ground. 
This heavy expenditure of ammunition will take place at the very beginning of — 
a battle and in a very short time. It is true that four or five well ranged rounds 
may disable an enemy’s battery, but, to arrive at these ranged rounds, it may be 
necessary to fire 20 or 30 rounds if the enemy has taken proper advantage of 
cover. 
Again, the introduction of smokeless powder for rifles will also tend to an 
increase in the expenditure of artillery ammunition at this period. Even in the 
days of black powder, as soon as the infantry opened fire their position was 
obscured by smoke and the aim of the guns no longer reliable. With the in- 
troduction of the new weapons this difficulty of defining the front and depth of 
the enemy’s position will be largely increased. It has often happened in the past 
that artillery has wasted ammunition on an unoccupied point, how much more 
frequent will these mistakes be in the future? Yet artillery, at whatever cost of 
ammunition, must prepare the way for its infantry. 
The large increase in the number of intrenching tools carried has given also © 
increased “facility to the infantry in taking cover and the power of shrapnel 
against even slight intrenchments has not increased much since 1870. Troops — 
of all ar ms, moreover, have gained great skill in taking advantage of cover. 
Lastly, the enormous depth of the masses engaged in firing “at each other will 
prolong the struggle to a degree which we have no ; possibility of calculating. 
We, therefore, are convinced that the expenditure of artillery ammunition in 
future wars will exceed our very highest anticipation. We must not calculate 
on a lower figure than 100 rounds an hour per battery. This would mean, in 
a two-days’ ‘battle of eight hours fighting each day, 1600 rounds per battery. 
This need not startle us, as it exactly represents the expenditure in the two-days’ 
battle at Leipsig. But who can say that a battle may not last three, or even 
four days, and that the expenditure may not reach 500 rounds a gun! This 
means the contents of 40 ammunition waggons. 
‘These considerations entail the following conclusions: (1.) Artillery must 
avoid, as far as possible, prolonged combats, must husband its ammunition, 
expend it only for really important objects and to solve really important tactical 
problems. (2.) Commanders must most carefully study the service of supply 
and the serving of an abundant supply of ammunition. All anxiety as to re- 
plenishment of ammunition should be removed from those engaged and the 
supplies should reach them in.an unceasing flow, and these supplies shonli 
always be prepared as for a battle of great duration. 
This may be secured by observing the following principles :— 
(a.) Forward movement.—This is synonymous with uninterrupted supply. 
Our present regulations recognize this as normal as far as armmu- 
nition columns-to batteries is concer ned, but as exceptional as regards — 
corps parks-to ammunition columns. As regards the grand “park 
sections, these remain on the railways and only exceptionally do they 
find at the great Etappen stations means of transport by ordinary 
