7 
for depdts of supplies. To such a station the lst echelon of the grand_ park 
should be sent forward and, on the eve of a battle, even other echelons. These 
may be called auxiliary unloading stations. 
The different echelons of the supply service must comply with requisitions 
from whatever corps they may come—red-tape regulations must not be allowed, 
in any case, to cause obstruction. If control is indispensable and must be carried 
out as far as possible, with regard to expenditure of rations, horses and forage, 
which may be misapplied, it may become decidedly hurtful when applied to 
‘ammunition. 
The Germans found in 1866 how harmful this excessive control may be— 
“ After every affair each battery had, together with an account of the fight, 
to submit an exact report of its state of ammunition and, in accordance with this 
report, it received an order on the ammunition column. Although, by the 
provision of blank forms, labour of writing was diminished as much as possible, 
it is well known that batteries suffered great inconvenience and were often unable 
to comply with office rules and requirements when the battle had lasted late into 
the evening and the troops had to bivouac where they stood and continue their 
advance next morning ”’ (Hohenléhe). 
Our present regulation lays down—* Every (artillery) unit, as soon as possible 
after the conclusion of the battle or, at the latest, on the morning of the following 
day, must send in a report of the numbers required to complete it to its establish- 
ment of men, ammunition, etc.” 
Such detailed reports, taken in connection with the principle of a general 
replenishment after the battle, seem to amount to the very system so forcibly 
condemned by Prince Hohenléhe. Report of expenditure of ammunition, when 
obtainable after a battle, should serve rather as a means of estimating difficulties, 
but not at all for the framing of orders for the issue of ammunition. 
To facilitate supply, the artillery commander of the army corps should 
periodically, say every hour during the battle, receive information of the ex- 
penditure of ammunition, but in round numbers only—so many waggons empty, 
so many nearly so, so many received from the ammunition column in park. He 
can then call up from the base (railway) station or its auxiliary station the 
requisite number of echelons. 
What we call the ‘elementary ” supply of batteries in action, 7.e., from their 
first three waggons, will be exhausted in 22 hours on the above mentioned basis 
of expenditure of 100 rounds an hour. The ammunition columns and corps 
park provide 84, say nine waggons, per battery, or three echelons. In order 
that the supply may be uninterrupted (calculating on a rate of movement of 2 
miles per hour), these echelons on the march should be respectively 54, 11 and 
22 miles from the leading battery of the advanced-guard. But the mere length 
of the column of waggons renders this impossible. ‘The echelons must then 
seize every chance of advancing at a rapid pace, profiting by the main road being 
clear or by side roads. The corps park, which by regulation is supposed to be 
25-30 miles behind the advanced-troops, must use even greater exertions to get 
forward. This can only be arrived at by initiative on the part of the commanders 
of echelons. 
The following example shows how little we can rely on keeping communication 
betweeen the head-quarters and the parks :— 
From the 6th-17th August, 1870, the corps park of the Prussian guard was 
unable to establish communication with its corps. The commander, on arrival at 
Mainz on the 8th, received no distinct orders as to the direction taken by the 
troops and from that time he wandered haphazard towards the 7. till he stumbled 
on the traces of his corps. He then marched by forced marches to Dieulouard. 
d 
Office re- 
turns to be 
reduced, 
Necessity for 
taking the 
initiative, 
