OKEHAMPTON EXPERIENCES, 1894. 3 
Section Commanders before leaving the layers should look to the 
dressing, and if one section cannot see the target without advancing 
far to the front, it appears desirable that the Section Commander should 
report it. This seems trivial, but neglect in reporting it often had bad 
results, as the following case, which occurred more than once, shows. 
The layers of a battery coming into action by the deliberate method, 
having had the target pointed out to them, extended from the right 
and took up positions for their guns; now, in consequence of the 
ground, the layers of the left section, in order to see the target, had to 
advance further to the front than those of the centre and right, this 
generally ended in one of two ways, both rather disastrous ; either— 
as the battery was coming up the left section layers, getting nervous 
about their dressing and seeing the Commanding Officer on their right, 
dressed back in line with the remainder, and, consequently, the guns 
could not see the target; or else, if they stood fast, the guns when 
in action were so far in advance that it was dangerous for the others 
to fire. 
When, however, the Battery Commander was on the left flank, 7.e., 
the advanced one, the other layers dressed up and no evil resulted. 
This seems to point to the necessity for the Battery Commander, after 
the layers are placed, but before the battery arrives, dressing them up 
on to the most advanced layer, rather than to the flank on which he 
happens to be. Sometimes the Battery Commander, when pointing 
out the target, appeared to go further forward than was necessary, 
and it was suggested that better concealment would be obtained if he 
only went sufficiently forward to be able just to see the target, and 
that the layers, after they had extended, should advance far enough to 
be able to see it over the sights. A few tried showing the target to 
the Section Commanders first, and then they showed it to their layers. 
With reference to this, one must remember that the ground at Oke- 
hampton, a bare hillside with no bushes, &c., makes it very hard to 
avoid exposure; further, the exposure always appears more to an 
onlooker with the battery than from the target. The group of layers, 
when seen from a flank, or from behind at a distance of a few yards, 
appears very different to what it does from the front at 38000 yards. 
On several occasions, together with officers of the courses, I stood 
looking out from a bomb-proof close to the target. Although the 
range was only 2000 yards, very little could be seen, and had we not 
known exactly where to look for the battery, it could easily have 
escaped notice until the first gun. 
I think more criticism from the target end of the range, especially 
during Brigade practice, would be valuable; but, of course, it must be 
from a bomb-proof close to the target, and not from the usual position 
of the range-party on a flank. 
One of the causes of the direct method coming to grief was that 
of not advancing sufficiently to the front for all the layers to see the 
target over the sights; although done in the hope of not exposing the 
battery, it appears a fatal error, for on all occasions, and most certainly 
when the direct method is employed (1.e., range short and great rapidity 
desirable), the first desideratum is to be able to see the target over the 
sights without any running up. ; 
