2 OKEHAMPTON EXPERIENCES, 1894. 
fact, with batteries coming from different stations, it is very hard to 
avoid them. 
Take the following case of three batteries, A., B., C., equipped as 
follows :— 
A. having Mark II. carriage and Mark I. sight. 
baat a BS i » with altered clamp. 
C. 
Say the range is 2100 yards. 
If using T scale and yards, B. and C. would have the same elevation, 
2.e., 2100 yards, and A. a greater one (2200) ; whilst, if using Scott’s 
sights and degrees, A. and B. would have the same elevation (8° 3’), and 
C. the lesser one (2° 48’). Thus, not only has the Adjutant to know what 
carriages and sights the batteries have, but even their clamps. 
The question, raised at this lecture two years ago by Col. Ollivant, 
as to whether it is necessary for a Battery Commander to verify, before 
adopting a range and fuze passed to him, still appears unsettled. The 
balance of opinion certainly is in favour of acceptance at once, because : 
99 39 If, 33 Ee) 92 
First, verification is generally impossible, on account of the num- 
ber of shells falling on the target. 
Second, concentration should be sudden, and if each battery has 
to verify, if cannot be so. 
It is, however, difficult to tell whether such a fire would be effective. 
I think it should, for there is rarely more than 50 yards between the 
elevations fired at by batteries when practising on the same day over 
the same ground: unless, of course, through bad observation any bat- 
tery has not found the range. It would, I think, be interesting to 
arrange a Brigade-day, so as to have range reports and test the question 
thoroughly. ‘Targets to be placed so that each battery had a separate 
one to start with, and as soon as each had reported range and fuze, 
the Officer Commanding could (in place of concentrating) change the 
targets amongst the batteries, who should open at once with the given 
range and fuze. 
OccuPATION OF PosITIONS. 
The two methods, as usual, gave rise to a good deal of talk. 
With regard to the deliberate, it struck one that it was a mistake for 
the Section Commander and gun-layers to make a race of it when 
doubling out to the Battery Commander. The latter could not start 
his instructions till all had arrived; further, the rush looks bad, and has 
the disadvantage that the layers arrive breathless, and shaking so 
much, that many are quite unable to set their sights. A slow, steady 
double appears quite sufficient. 
The chief cause of failure of the deliberate was, that the gun-layers 
did not pay sufficient attention to choosing positions for their guns 
from which the target could be seen over the-sights; consequently, 
after the guns were in action they often had to be shifted. In order to 
avoid this, in some batteries the Section Commanders, before returning 
to the battery, placed their layers, and gave them orders not to move. 
This generally worked well, and is quite worth the extra time it takes. 
