110 THE STORY OF THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
science of making war on the map.” Lee’s conceptions were often 
profound, and McClellan, even when wrong, displayed that imaginative 
grasp which aimed at great results, and would not be content with a 
victory, when combinations, which might work a.downfall, were possi- 
bie. But with comparatively raw levies and inexperienced subordinate 
leaders, tactics often failed.to accomplish what strategy placed within 
their reach. Seldom, we think» we might say never, was even a 
carefully planned battle fought out as the supreme leader intended. 
At the end Gettysburg. was finally lost through the impatience of 
Pickett, and at the beginning Bull Run exhibited the uselessness of 
successful strategy when the means of reaping its fruits cannot be 
relied on. The zealous soldier need wade through no ponderous 
volumes, therefore, to learn all that will be of practical help to him in 
his career, nor need he stay to follow with strained attention the move- 
ments of each brigade or battalion. He will learn sounder tactics from 
the records of 1870, but he will acquire a deeper insight into the 
broad principles of war if he follow the schemes of Lee and Grant. 
And he may begin his studies by gaining a very clear conception of the 
exact legal and political positions occupied by both parties in the pages 
before us. Why the North and South quarrelled is a question, the 
thorough investigation of which would need a whole volume to itself, 
but Mr. Ropes has succeeded in touching on this subject with such 
adroitness as to tell us just as much as we need to know in order to 
understand the campaigns and no more. That the South made a 
blunder in the manner in which they commenced hostilities there can 
be no doubt. Far wiser would it have been had they allowed pro- 
visions to be freely furnished to the little garrison of Fort Sumter. 
Such an act of considerate forbearance would have gained them much 
sympathy amongst their former friends, and many wayverers might 
have been definitely drawn towards them by such generosity. The 
patriotism of the North would not in that case have been aroused, as 
if was eventually by the roar of the Confederate guns. Lincoln and 
his administration in all probability would either have been attacked 
for feebleness and indicision, or would have been condemned for some 
ageressive action. As it was, the onus of civil war was made to rest 
‘on Southern shoulders, and that too in an opening fight which had 
little of chivalry about it. Then Lincoln affected to treat what was 
really war as a mere insurrection. He commanded “ the persons com- 
‘posing the combinations aforesaid to disperse and retire peaceably to 
their respective abodes within twenty days.” Such a view is almost 
ludicrous in its contempt for the Southern pretentions. Jor the 
seceding States claimed to be in fact independent nations, and they 
asserted that they had as much right to leave the Union as Germany or 
Italy has to quit the triple alliance of to-day. There was no doubt a 
‘cunning policy at work in Lincoln’s mind, for to ask for troops to con- 
quer and subdue communities which so lately had been States in the 
Union could not but have had an unpleasant ring about it. But, what- 
ever was his reason, his call was responded to with an unanimity and 
heartiness which astonished the world. He thenceforth became the 
leader of a great national movement, and was supported with the same 
