THE STORY OF THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA, 111 
zealand enthusiasm which a war against a foreign invader would have» 
called forth. 
Unfortunately his knowledge of military matters did not equal his 
political sagacity, and Mr. Ropes nowhere displays the surprising grasp, 
of strategy and military considerations for which he is remarkable than 
in his criticism of the great Federal statesman’s administration of the: 
war department. ‘The senior officers in the army of the Union were 
no doubt in most cases too old for active service, and it was desirable: 
to replace them by younger officers. But to place civilian volunteers far 
up in the hierarchy of military command was a widely different thing. 
Butler, who indeed had commanded the Massachusetts Militia, and 
Banks, who had been Governor of Washineten and Speaker of the \ 
National House of Representatives—“ both men without any military. 
training or experience whatever’”—were made Major-Generals of. 
Volunteers. The case of Frémont was even worse. He had been 
an unsuccessful competitor with Buchanan for the Presidency in 1856, 
and he had gained some reputation as an explorer in the far North- 
West, but this hardly qualified him to become a Major-General in the 
regular army, still less to supersede the brave and capable Lyon in 
Missouri. A national crisis is scarcely the time to satisfy embarrassing 
claims or reward political services by the gift of appointments which, 
involve such vast responsibilities as the commands of armies, and the 
National cause undoubtedly suffered severely when duties, on the, 
intelligent management of which everything depended, were entrusted 
to inexperienced men. Neither Lincoln’s acumen or patriotism seem 
to have been equal to the occasion here; possibly he may have been 
imbued with something of that jealousy of military rank which then 
tinged popular feeling in America, and has not always been unknown 
over here, but more probably it was what Dr. Johnson would have 
termed “sheer ignorance” of the military necessities of the situation 
which led him astray. 
The earlier portions of this volume are taken with the discussion 
of questions such as these, where political, legal, and military considera- 
tions have each important bearings on the issues, and concerning them 
Mr. Ropes speaks with the knowledge and ability of a professional 
expert. But he shows a remarkable appreciation of strategical pro- 
blems later on, and justly gives prominence to them in his analysis. 
For in truth, as we have said already, with officers and troops more or 
less new to their work, tactics were usually indifferent and but few 
fields were won by their skilful application. Nowhere is this better 
illustrated than in the first battle of Bull Run. The Federal strategy 
was good, and only failed to gain the end it aimed at because the 
mechanism which it directed was not in proper gear. On the other 
side a true conception of the situation underlay the schemes of the 
Southern Generals, but they never were even put to the test because 
of the miscarriage of an order. ‘The intentions of neither side were 
therefore really carried out, while the Federals, who had all but effected 
their purpose in the beginning, were defeated in the end. By the way, 
we have never seen an unpleasant admission more cleverly veiled in 
honeyed periphrasis than the tale of their retreat is here. “In spite 
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