132 GENERAL BOURBAKI’S CAMPAIGN. 
went to Sedan and thence to Paris, as the 4th army, or army of the 
Meuse ; the 38rd German army was on the left of the 4th, and went 
round Paris to the south, as the 4th army did to the north. Metz 
was invested on the 19th of August, Paris was invested on the 
19th of September. The investment of these two—of the great 
fortress and of the vast metropolis—occupied four German armies; a 
German division (the Baden) went down to Strasburg and invested it 
under General Von Werder. Practically, therefore, by the end of 
September all the German forces in France, with the exception of 
Etappen troops, were around Metz, Paris and Strasburg. The capitu- 
lation of Strasburg about the 27th of September set free Von Werder, 
who went into the Vosges district towards Vesoul and Dijon, and 
a reserve division joining him under Von Tresckow I. (there were 
two 'resckows) invested Belfort. Now we come to October and 
the beginning of November. 
Gambetta, after the new Government had been formed in Paris, had 
got out of Paris in a balloon, and after being wafted in different 
directions in some serious danger from German bullets and otherwise, 
got to Tours. He then organised armies behind the Loire, in the 
Sologne district, under D’Anrelles de Paladines. 
I need not tell you they were defeated between the 28th of November 
and the 4th of December. A force of some 250,000 strong, was cut in 
two by the 4th of December, part of it went between the Loire and the 
Loir, south of the forest of Marchenoir, under Chanzy, and the other 
part remained about Bourges and Nevers, under Bourbaki. It is the 
latter part that we have to deal with. 
But how came it that the Germans were able to cope with two 
corps from the direction of Amiens, the 22nd and 23rd, and a variety 
of corps along the Loire, the 15th, 16th, 18th, part of 19th, 20th and 
21st? The reason why they were able to cope with these new levies 
of Gambetta was that, in the meantime, Metz had capitulated, and the 
corps investing that fortress were at the disposal of the German staff; 
on the 27th of October. Nos. I. and VIII. went north-west; Nos. LIL., 
IX. and X.,7.e., the Brandenburg, the Hesse and the Hanoverian corps, 
went tothe Loire; II. went towards Paris at first, VII. invested some 
northern forts. III., 1X., X. and the Duke of Mecklenburg’s corps, 
XITI., broke D’Aureiles de Paladines. 
Now to come to the beginning of January, 1871. You will observe, 
gentlemen, that the opportune surrender of Metz by Bazaine, enabled 
the Germans to cope with the greatest levée en masse in history. The 
levée en masse of 1871 was by no means as effective or so well organised 
as the re-arrangement of the Federal forces in America after the first 
battle on Bull Run, because it took McClellan from July, 1861, 
to March, 1862, before he moved his newly organised army ; whereas 
Gambetta did not leave Paris till early in October, and his army was 
moving and fighting early in November. I must say that great credit 
is due to Gambetta for puttimg some kind of soul into an inert mass, 
and getting some kind of order among these hastily collected levies ; 
credit must also be given to his subordinates, de Freycinet, D’ Aurelles 
de Paladines and others. But for the opportune fall of Metz, it is 
