GENERAL BOURBAKI’S CAMPAIGN. 137 
mobilisation business. A book has been written about that which no 
doubt is in your library, and is interesting to all officers who have to 
deal with the movement of troops by rail; it is written by a French 
Engineer, who was employed by the Ministry of Public Works to in- 
quire into the matter, M. Le Bleu; his report is also in Freycinet’s book. 
He shows that the whole movement suffered a kind of physical and 
moral paralysis from the very start. These four corps, the 18th, 20th, 
24th and 15th (because the 15th came eastward after it had served as 
a screen for the others) were tied to one line of railway, and that line 
of railway was badly managed; the troops were standing for days at a 
particular station, the officers were afraid to move them into the country 
to get them food, the horses were half starved: there were 150,000 
men ina most criticalcondition. Imust say that the cavalry was a very 
small matter, made up of the débris of divers regiments, the proper 
cavalry of France being at this moment in Germany as the result of the 
capitulations of Sedan and of Metz. ‘The cavalry was nothing consider- 
able, and I do not suppose if it had heen of real value it could have done 
very much. Certainly the German cavalry in the south-western theatre 
in the Le Mans campaign, four divisions of them, did not gain much 
distinction, because they could not do much owing to the weather, the 
state of the ground, and owing to the character of the country in which 
they were employed. ‘Therefore I do not suppose that Bourbaki really 
lost much by not having a good cavalry force. We do not find that 
Von Werder did anything worth dwelling upon with his cavalry ; it 
was Just as much as infantry could do to march on these frozen roads. 
As I have said therefore, Bourbaki was in difficulties with regard to 
mobility, even when he was moving by rail, and by road with such a 
system of commissariat as he had—a hastily improvised commissariat—. 
his difficulties were enormously increased. 
I hope that our volunteers will not have a similar commissariat if 
England is ever invaded, but I have reasons to believe that many 
volunteer corps would not be perplexed to the last degree if called 
upon to march and live in Kent. Let their authorities see the results 
of improvised supply in Bourbaki’s army. This commissariat, thus 
hastily improvised, could not bring the food from train to troops. Yet 
plenty of food, plenty of ammunition, and plenty of money were at the 
disposal of the French Government. 
So Bourbaki gets along till about the 8th of January, when at 
last Von Werder comes to the conclusion that it is nearly time to 
move to his position on the Lisaine, or he would be intercepted. 
The French were marching on the 8th to the south and east of 
Vesoul, when Von Werder moved from Vesoul to Villersexel, sent 
the 25th regiment and the reserve into the town, the Prussians to 
the right, to a place called Marat, and the Baden folk to the north. 
By most military writers,—in fact I think in General Clery’s book, 
which we have most of us had to learn—Villersexel is given as an 
admirable example of the manner in which troops may be stopped by 
an attack on their flank. Von Werder wanted time. He thought he 
had near him one French corps, the 18th, and he said, “1 will stop 
you.” He attacked it and stopped it ; but during the course of the 
