138 GENERAL BOURBAKI’S CAMPAIGN. 
action he found that he had to deal not merely with the 18th, but also 
with two other corps, 20 and 24. He accordingly prolonged the action 
of Villersexel the whole of the 9th, and street fighting occurred at one 
o’clock in the morning of the 10th; he therefore fastened himself, as to 
speak, on the French army like a bull-dog, and would not let go his 
hold until it suited him. The result of that was that Bourbaki halted 
his three corps and deployed them, and Von Werder calculated that 
when once his antagonists had turned north and pivoted on their left, it 
would be some time before they could move east pivoted on their right ; 
he had rightly concluded that such an army had no mobility, that when 
once it turned out of its direct course such an army as that would take 
some time before it could resume its original direction. His judgment 
was exact, his anticipations were realised to the fullest. On the morning 
of the 10th he expected to be attacked, and Bourbaki expected to be 
attacked. The German not being attacked simply left a rear-guard, 
and drew off eastward at leisure, until he came to the Lisaine on 
the llth. Ithink you will find, gentlemen, that the manner in which 
Von Werder first stopped Bourbaki at Villersexel, and having stopped 
him marched round his right, and, skilfully anticipating, him got between 
him and Belfort, and then took up a strong position on the river 
Lisaine, constitutes one of the most interesting and instructive opera- 
tions by a small army, some 35,000 men, that is recorded at any rate in 
modern history. It wasa good business-like transaction, a masterpiece 
of military skill, no flurry about the matter, well conceived and well 
executed (applause). 
The space occupied by the German army of 45,000 men was about 
14 miles long from left to right. Debschitz’s detachment was on the 
left, the 4th Landwehr and the Prussian regulars in the centre, and the 
Baden troops either on the.extreme right or in reserve, while Von 
Treschow with the 1st Landwehr continued the investment of Belfort. 
The 7th French military division was opposed to Debschitz, next from 
right to left were 15, 24, 20 and 18. Cremev’s division was coming up. 
Cremer deserves a word of well-earned praise; his division of 15,000 
men deserved as high honour as they could get. They made a forced 
march. under the most deplorable conditions conceivable. This division 
had been detained at Dijon till the 9th of January by a piteous appeal 
from General Garibaldi, who was as full of military nervousness at this 
time as he had been previously full of political enthusiasm. He mistook 
the appearance of afew Uhlans for the advance of the whole Prussian 
army. In point of fact at no time was there more than a brigade detached 
down towards Dijon, Kettlers’s, the 8th brigade, part of the 2nd corps, 
but it was quite sufficient to frighten the very life out of Garibaldi’s 
people, although Garibaldi, I believe, had 15,000, and de Freycinet says 
he could have been reinforced to 30,000. Garibaldi delayed Cremer. 
Then by forced marches Cremer went round to Lure. His troops 
reached Lure on the 14th of January, wearied, as may well be imagined, 
when it is remembered that the French soldier carried 60 lbs. weight, and 
cold—the temperature was exceedingly low, some present may remem- 
ber the winter, it was a very severe one indeed—and colder still because 
shoe-leather had failed, and in many instances the men were barefooted, 
