179 
TORPEDO-BOAT RAIDS ON HARBOURS. 
BY. 
LIEUTENANT C. G. VEREKER, R.A. 
Tue discussion opened by Captain Wray, and followed up in the 
November issue of the R.A.I. “ Proceedings,” brings forward one of 
the most important points for consideration of Officers of the Garrison 
Artillery. 
I notice, however, that none of the papers deal with any recognised 
scheme of defence, and as this would lead officers not acquainted with 
the subject to infer that no provision is made for meeting such an 
attack, I venture to think that a few remarks, the result of what 
information I have been able to obtain on the subject, will not be out 
of place. 
It is impossible to have one idea suitable to the various ports that 
would be liable to attack, only some general lines for guidance can be 
laid down, and a scheme would in every case have to be worked out 
to suit local conditions. 
OBSTACLES. 
Booms are in course of construction, or let us hope soon will be, for 
closing the entrances to our most important harbours, and this seems 
the most effectual method, if not the only one, of keeping the enemy’s 
torpedo-boats out. 
The French seem to realise the importance of this, and stop at no 
expense in making their harbours secure; at Cherbourg, one of their 
strongest ports, they have lately connected their two island forts, Ile 
Pelée and Fort Cavagnac, to the mainland by strong breakwaters, 
thus completely closing these two passes to torpedo-boats. 
If there is no boom, some class of obstacle should certainly be 
constructed ; fixed posts built up near the channel in shallow waters 
or boats moored at intervals have been suggested; these would carry 
a few machine or Q.F’. guns, which could oppose an effective fire to the 
advance of the enemy, sufficient probably to delay him and keep him 
in the illuminated area, and under fire of the shore guns. 
An attack by day should not be difficult to defeat, supposing we 
have an adequate supply of quick-fire guns. 
The heavy guns might also fire shrapnel, on the principle laid down 
for meeting a “Running Past” attack, the fuzes being set at varying 
lengths to give a wide area covered by bullets. 
Service case shot would probably not be effective over 300 to 400 
yards, and special case with heavy balls are necessary; even these 
would not be effective much over 1000 yards. 
Warning could be given of an enemy’s approach, and everything 
would be ready to give him a warm reception. 
We can look upon such an attack as highly improbable, so what we 
must consider is a night raid, when torpedo-boats would attempt to 
run in and do what damage they could, and get out again under 
cover of darkness. 
4, VOL. XXII. 
