214, CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY. 
gade and Cleeve’s and Hawker’s guns ata disadvantage in the rain and 
mist, had taken them in flank and rear, had slain or captured two-thirds 
of the brigade and six of the guns, and had penetrated through to every 
part of our position. Beresford himself had a hand-to-hand encounter 
with a Polish Lancer, and owed his life to his great personal strength 
and courage. 
One of Colborne’s battalions however stood firmly on the heights, 
and our cavalry were at hand in the hour of need. Never in fact did 
the three arms more loyally co-operate than at this crisis. There have 
been bigger battles, but none I think more glorious to our soldiers 
(applause). 
I wish I could give closer details, but I have found that to try and 
find particulars of some of these glorious actions of the great wars is a 
most hopeless and disappointing task. The regimental records of the 
8rd and 4th Dragoon Guards dismiss deeds that should be cherished 
by every man in their ranks in a few niggardly lines. The artillery 
despatch was lost, and we have only some private letters from some 
of the officers engaged to go upon. But the good service done by the 
cavalry and guns is recognised handsomely, if too briefly for the 
students’ needs, by everyone who has written of that day. Marshal 
Beresford’s despatch was most flattering to the artillery, and so was that 
of General Lumley, while Brigadier-General Long! who commanded our 
light cavalry writes in a private letter :—“ The dispersion of our cavalry 
scarcely left us 400 or 500 British at any point, and these with two 
regiments of Spaniards, were all we had to offer by way of resistance to 
their numerous and overwhelming columns. ‘he ground however 
favoured us, and the Horse Artillery did its duty with brilliant effect. 
The enemy lost a great number of men, and from 400 to 500 horses by 
the operation of this arm alone.” Consider what a loss of 400 or 500 
horses means to a cavalry division on active service! I think you will 
agree with me that to inflict such a loss as that under the circumstances 
argues well for the coolness and courage of the gunners (loud applause). 
And now, gentlemen, is there no lesson to be drawn from this ancient 
history? May not guns and cavalry be called upon in the future to 
play just the same part in which their predecessors distinguished 
themselves in those far off days? Can we ensure genius on the part 
of our generals now any more than we could then, and under similar 
conditions of leadership and atmosphere might not precisely the same 
incidents once more recur? A dull man and a rainy day! Is the com- 
bination an absolutely remote contingency even in this nineteenth 
century? If not, then I say, a weak flank may once more have to be 
protected against the inroad of an overbearing foe, British infantry 
and guns may again be surprised and ridden over by an active cavalry, 
and the vigilance and readiness of the same arm may again be indis- 
pensable if disaster is to be retrieved (loud applause). 
Nine days afterwards there was a brilliant little cavalry fight at 
Usagre when Lumley with his two fine regiments, Madden’s Portuguese, 
1 Extract from a letter of Brigadier-General R. B, Long, from “ Biyouac near Vicente,’’ dated 
the 26th June, 1811. 
