CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY. 215 
and “D” troop, was attacked by Latour Maubourg with the whole of 
his cavalry division and some guns. The French were driven off with a 
loss of 200 men for, as a letter from an officer engaged says cheerfully, 
“the instant our jolly fellows came near them, they turned and were 
sabred in good style.” I cannot pause now to tell you more of that 
fight however, nor of Ribera,! where the services of “ D” troop were 
again especially brilliant, and probably no man ever received a higher 
tribute than did Captain H. C. Whinyates who was its second captain. 
But I may just mention that during a communication after the action 
under a flag of truce the French leader, General Lallemand, made 
particular enquiries for the name of the officer who had commanded 
the guns near the river, and on learning it sent the following message 
to Captain Whinyates. “Tell that brave man that, if it had not been 
for him, I should have beaten your cavalry, but that meeting me in every 
movement with his fire, he never would allow me to form for attack. 
Say that I shall mention his name in my orders as having been the 
cause of our defeat, and not your cavalry. Be sure you tell him this. 
Promise to give him my message” ? (applause). 
There are other actions too gentlemen, of which I could tell you, in 
which our cavalry and guns loyally played into one another’s hands, but 
I must leave myself time to dwell on perhaps the most splendid deed of 
all as far as cavalry is concerned, and one of which I have found it 
possible to get minute details. It is very far indeed from being an ideal 
cavalry and artillery battle planned and fought out according as theory 
directs and with odds on both sides equal. I can assure you it is 
almost impossible to find such. There is nearly always something 
abnormal which spoils the symmetry of the fight. One side or other 
is supported by infantry, or fights with smooth-bored cannon against 
rifled ones, or there are no guns present, or one party declines the 
combat just at the interesting moment. However I believe there is 
more than one lesson in the story I am going to tell you, and so I will 
ask you to bear with me even if I relate a drama played out, as in 
war is nearly always the case, scarcely in a way to satisfy rigid and 
exacting critics. 
But before I go any further into this the most difficult and important 
portion of the subject I want to put it to you with all the cogency I can 
command, that now Horse Artillery and cavalry leaders alike must for- 
get some of the lessons they have acquired when studying the Corps 
Artillery side of Horse Artillery training. There is no time now for 
deliberation, every shot must tell; the artillery leader will often have 
to act on his own responsibility ; there must be the most complete and 
thorough understanding between the two arms. Owing to the natural 
wish to get the most out of their armament I believe we have trained 
our Horse Artillery batteries too much lately with a view only to the 
Corps Artillery side of their usefulness. On the other hand they have 
done so well at Okehampton that cavalry soldiers are fascinated by the 
accounts of their destructive powers ab comparatively long ranges. I 
124th July, 1812. 
2 Vide History of ** C” Battery, p. 64. 
