220 CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY. 
a few years after the Crimean war was over.!_ The glory of the heavy 
charge at Balaclava belongs to our cavalry alone. Nota shot, not a 
shell, was fired by any Horse Artillery gun,? until the Russians were 
fairly in retreat, they were beaten by the pluck and dash of our Dragoons, 
and by nothing else, and I in no sense wish to claim any share of one of 
the most brilliant feats of history for the Horse Artillerymen (loud 
applause). But after the foe was first turned back, they did some 
service too, and we can learn something from their conduct. The 
reason however why I selected this as an example to discuss was be- 
cause I have been able to get close information with regard to it from 
two absolutely reliable sources. I regret I cannot further indicate 
them. One from Russia, for obvious reasons, it is better to keep secret. 
The other is supplied by a man who is as modest as he was brave and 
capable when in the service and he wishes his name not to appear 
(applause). 
Now I will briefly tell you so much of the story of the day as concerns 
us this evening. 
Seeing the Turks giving way in the Gorge of Kadikoi, here (pointing 
to the diagram) Lord Raglan sent 8 squadrons of our heavy brigade to 
their assistance. General Scarlett was in the act of executing this 
mission and had with him the 5th Dragoon Guards, the Scots Greys, and 
the Inniskilling Dragoons, in all six squadrons, while two squadrons 
of the 4th Dragoon Guards were following him, and two of the Royals 
joined him later. The six squadrons in front had got into two columns 
owing to an obstruction in their path, and of these the right hand 
column was led by the Ist squadron of the Inniskillings and closed by 
the two squadrons of the 5th Dragoon Guards, and the one on the 
left hand by the 2nd squadron of the Inniskillings and closed by two 
squadrons of the Greys. No patrols or scouts covered the march of 
these troops. Suddenly the head of an immense Russian column of 
cavalry, composed of probably not less than 2000 men, is seen crown- 
ing the causeway heights on our left flank not more than seven or 
eight hundred yards away. Scarlett on the left flank of our left column 
determined at once to attack them, and wheeled the three squadrons 
beside him into line to the left, the other three forming the right 
hand column were wheeled to face the enemy too, and constituted 
what was practically a second line. The 1st squadron of the Innis- 
killings had gained on the others during the march, and was formed 
therefore to their right rear. 
1 Captain Brandling died of consumption at Leeds, 16th April, 1860. 
2 TI somewhat accentuated the fact that ** a” Troop did not fire on the Russian cavalry until 
they were in retreat, because I did not Wish it to be supposed that I at all wanted to minimise the 
splendid achievement of our Dragoons. Since I gave the lecture I have had evidence before me, 
and especially letters from General Sir Robert Biddulph, G.C.M.G., C.B., R.A., who was with 
Barker’s Battery near Kadikoi on the day in question, which shows clearly that that battery did 
fire at the Russian cavalry column, which attacked Scarlett, before the collision took place. As 
to the value of that fire [need not now open a discussion; for it does not affect my point, which 
is to show that it was Brandling’s clear insight and decision which prevented the Russians from 
rallying or making a second charge, nor my contention that, had arrangements andZequipment 
been better considered, the Horse Artillery would have been in their proper place in sufficient 
time to have had a glorious chance at the huge target the Russian column would haye offered. 
them just before our_men fell upon it, 
