CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY. 221 
The three squadrons in front numbered some 800 men, those in rear 
not quite as many more. The two squadrons of the 4th Dragoon 
Guards, and of the Royal Dragoons were meanwhile moving on to sup- 
port. Now there is nothing more gallant, or more creditable in the 
whole of military history than the manner in which this handful of men 
behind Scarlett dauntlessly faced and attacked an enemy immensely 
superior to them in numbers, and moving against them with all the ad- 
vantage of the ground in their favour. But we cannot pause to dwell 
on the details even of so gloriousa feat. We want to look into the 
artillery side of the action, and a battery was hurrying up to try and 
find a place in the impending combat. 
“C” Troop had been quartered with and attached to the light divi- 
sion, and had that morning been called from its camp, five-and-a-half 
miles away. Why, you will ask, was not the troop with the cavalry ? 
Why indeed! Hxcept that during the Peninsular war Ross’s troop— 
The Chestnut Troop—had been and made its reputation, not with 
cavalry, but with Craufurd’s celebrated light division, There were only 
two troops of Horse Artillery in the Crimea, “I” and “C;” of these, 
“T” had been allotted to the cavalry, and was now with the light bri- 
gade, and “C,” as I have said, was with the light division. Far better 
had it been had another Peninsular precedent been followed; for Lord 
Paget, as he then was, had command of a cavalry division of five regi- 
ments and two Horse Artillery batteries during Sir John Moore’s 
campaign in 1808.1 
But the fault of not keeping the Horse Artillery with the cavalry was 
in 1854 further aggravated in spite of what experience taught by 
arming “C” Troop with four 9-prs. and two 24-pr. howitzers. An 
equipment too heavy for Horse Artillery. A rough road and an un- 
wieldy equipment destroyed the chance the guns had of effectively 
co-operating. As an eye-witness tells us, the horses “reeled and 
trembled,” when they haited after the excessive strain, and after all 
the troop arrived a few minutes too late. 
As it came down from the upland past the Col, this way (pointing to 
the map) the troop was met about here by a staff officer with a message 
from General Fox Strangways (remember him, gentlemen, he had 
fought with the Rocket Troop at Leipzig, was wounded at Waterloo 
and was killed at Inkerman), calling it to a certain spot on the left of 
the heavies. “C” Troop was then commanded by Captain John Brand- 
ling, a man who seems to me, from what I have heard of his behaviour 
1 The 7th, 10th, and 18th Hussars, the 15th Light Dragoons, and the 8rd Light Dragoons of the 
the K.G.L., with “B” and “*C” Troops, R.H.A. 
2 The 9-pr. equipment armament of ‘C0 ”’ Troop in 1854, weighed, gun, 38 cwt. 29 qrs., Waggon, 
(without spare wheel), 84. cwt. 1 qr. 17 lbs. 
6-pr. equipment armament of “1”? Troop 28 ewt. 23 lbs., waggon, 33 ewt. 3 qrs. 8 Ibs. 
24-pr. Howitzers for 9-pr. equipment, 39 ewt. 1 qr. 11 lbs., waggon, 35 ewt. 1 qr. 20 lbs. 
12-pr. Howitzers for 6-pr. equipment, 29 ewt. 17bs., waggon, 31 ewt. 2 qrs. 13 lbs. 
No men on limbers or elsewhere have been included in these weights which have been kindly ob- 
tained for me by Col. F. A. Whinyates. 
The weight of the 12 pr. B.L. and limber is 39 ewt. 3qrs. 9 Ibs, “ with personal equipment and 
detachment.’? Vide Handbook of 1893, 2 ’ 
