230 CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY. 
the field of battle when the cavalry and Horse Artillery are performing what Major 
May spoke of as the corps duties, there, our opportunities, as you all know, lie 
almost entirely in fleeting moments when the enemy’s infantry, or whatever it is, 
is more or less disorganized, half beaten and demoralized, or flushed with success 
and pressing boldy on. Then comes or would come our opportunity in real war. 
But when do we ever get those opportunities at manceuvres ? We simply cannot 
get them, or cannot take advantage of them. We often have a rainy day and we 
often flatter ourselves that we have a dull man in front, but we cannot always get 
the umpires to admit that much even, and in deprecation of the severe remarks 
which have been made I must repeat that the cavalry do not have a fair chance at 
sham-fights, and that they certainly do not have the opportunities that they would 
have on the actual field of battle, of which I hope we should be found prepared, 
as we have ever been before, to take advantage. 
There are one or two minor points upon which I differ from Major May. One 
is about escorts for the Horse Artillery, He seemed to attach importance to 
Horse Artillery having a more prominent escort. 
Masor E. 8. May—Not a strong one. 
Masor-GEneRaL Compe—They hardly want any at all; they practically want . 
a very small escort just to furnish scouts and to prevent their being taken by sur- 
prise, because the duty of the nearest body of cavalry is to support them, and to 
turn to the protection of their artillery ; and they must trust to that. Then again, 
in the action, when once the attacking force, the two lines, are in the van of 
operations, the artillery must cease fire; and then I think they ought to limber- 
up and move up to the front as fast as they can; it is no good thinking of retreat ; 
their whole fate depends upon the cavalry. If the cavalry is beaten the artillery 
is lost; it is no question then of limbering-up and getting away—the guns are 
gone. 
Lrsut.-GaneraL Sir Wriii1am Stirring, K.C.B.—Sir Evelyn Wood, and 
gentlemen. It seems to me that in order to have effective co-operation between guns 
and cavalry we must come to some more definite understanding than we have yet 
arrived at as to the weight behind the team. It is a curious thing that we should 
have got nearly to the end of the 19th century and that there should still be un- 
certainty upon this point. This evening reference has been made to a 6-pr. troop 
and a 9-pr. troop working with cavalry. Ido not know whether any gentleman 
here holds that guns can co-operate with cavalry with a weight behind the team 
of 40 cwt. I maintain that they cannot (applause). Guns have altered in the last 
fifty years, but horses have not, and I do not think that we can get more out of 
our teams now than we did in the Peninsula; and if so we are surely not justified 
in setting aside the experience then gained, and in overweighting our teams as the 
tendency is in the present day. 
The wonderful things that were done in the Peninsula by Horse Artillery co- 
operating with cavalry, and the wonderful things that were done in India by 
Horse Artillery co-operating with cavalry were I believe in every case with a 
weight behind the team of under 30 cwt. It is true that before Waterloo certain 
Horse Artillery batteries took over 9-pr. equipments, and the results showed that 
this was a very wise arrangement; but there is nothing in that campaign, as it 
seems to me, to warrant the conclusion that because those Horse Artillery 
batteries had 9-prs. in this memorable action and did good service with them that 
therefore it was possible for a gun of this weight to co-operate effectively with 
cavalry. And I think that that must also have been the opinion of those in 
authority ; for when the expedition was fitted out for the Crimea the battery which 
was told off to co-operate with the cavalry was “I” Troop, R.H.A., with a 6-pr. 
equipment. “C” Troop R.H.A., was sent out at the same time, with a 9-pr. 
