CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY. DES} 
into the normal preparatory formation. Well, a normal formation, to begin with, 
is only given as a sort of guide. There is no time for asking for instructions in 
the cavalry and a normal formation is of great use to a commander of a line who 
has received no instruction as may be the case; at the same time preparatory and 
fighting formations admit of many variations. But as to the time that it takes ; 
why, to deploy with attack formation takes no time at all, it is done during the 
advance. Iam afraid there is no twenty minutes to spare. If we could have a 
nice twenty minutes for our artillery to fire I should be very glad, but I think if 
you have five minutes you would be extraordinarily lucky. 
With regard to the fire of Horse Artillery being entirely against the enemy’s 
cavalry, I do not know that the Regulations lay that down so clearly. It says 
that it is to be against the cavalry because the cavalry is a dangerous arm at that 
time; but I do not think it forbids what the highest authorities on the Continent 
insist upon, namely, that the enemy’s artillery should first, if possible, be crushed. 
And from what Colonel Marshall tells us it seems that you have only got to fire 
one or two shrapnel at an enemy’s battery and you have done with it—your cavalry 
will be perfectly free, because it will have no enemy’s guns to fear—with such 
power of destruction as Colonel Marshall has described you will have destroyed 
everything for a space of 200 yards at least round the battery. 
With regard to Horse Artillery going straight to the front or to the flank, I 
agree with Colonel French that there is probably only one position for the artillery 
and which that is the Cavalry Commander taking counsel with the Horse Artillery 
Commander will have to decide. It is all the better if that position lies to the 
front, and if he can manceuvre round the enemy’s flank so much the better; but 
that flank movement of the cavalry takes up time it must be remembered, and will 
the enemy give you time? I think it must depend upon circumstances whether 
you go to the front or to the flank ; it must depend upon the best position for the 
guns and upon the nature of the country; and on the principal factor, the enemy. 
With regard to an escort some seem to think that a cavalry escort is necessary 
for guns. I must say that I do not agree with that. If the enemy sends out a 
regiment and you have a squadron as escort the latter will be of no good as 
protection. 
A sufficient number of scouts well out to the front and flanks watching carefully 
against surprise should be sufficient for them. 
With regard to the opinion expressed that an attack on artillery is useless. T 
think that if the artillery is firing heavily on you it is a good thing to make a feint 
or even an attack with a squadron or two, or even more, to draw the fire away 
from the cavalry, for the moment any portion of the enemy’s cavalry threatens a 
battery you may be sure the fire will be turned on the former, which, if in extended 
order will suffer little. I have seen in Germany a large force of cavalry attack a 
line of guns. It is a thing that is constantly practised—a whole brigade or divi- 
sion will be taken to doit. Captain Grierson well describes how it is done, in 
the accounts of last year’s manceuvres in Germany. The first lines are being widely 
extended, the second lines less widely, and then some échelons on the flank, and 
then reserves, riding right up to, round and through the guns and going on beyond, 
attacking any troops that may be behind the guns. I am afraid I have kept you 
a long time. [ can only say further in the words of one of our greatest artillery- 
men, the loss of whom we all regret—a great authority indeed—-General Hamley, 
“let it be granted that cavalry properly trained and led, may play as great a part 
as ever on the stage of war; combined with new and larger proportion of artillery 
its action may be decisive to the fate of battles, and launched in pursuit of a broken 
1Prince Frederick Charles, Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe and all modern authorities deprecate de« 
taching squadrons as escort to Horse Artillery. Home’s “ Précis of Modern Tactics” gives reasons 
clearly for this. j 
32 
