CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GUNS AND CAVALRY. 239 
with great diffidence before so many cavalry officers, and I confess I have had 
no close personal experience on that point; but I was looking up this subject for 
my lecture, and I found in a certain text-book that it was laid down that they 
might take—I think it said from a quarter of an hour to half an hour!—at any 
rate some enormous time. It struck meat the time as exceptionally long, and [ 
therefore steered a middle course. I suppose the time taken depends largely on 
the march formation and the nature of the country, but all I meant to dwell upon 
was that, if the cavalry were delayed while getting into the preparatory formation, 
and the enemy’s artillery opened upon them, when the squadrons were stationary, 
our guns, in spite of what I said as to decisive ranges, must unlimber and engage 
the hostile artillery—I wanted to lay stress upon that point too, because I had 
said just before that they were only to fire as much as possible at the enemy’s 
cavalry. Jam very glad to hear that [am wrong about the time, and that our 
cavalry will be so much quicker than I gave them credit for. 
With reference to what Sir Evelyn said as to artillery having fired on the 
Russian cavalry | must admit I was under the impression that the victory was 
entirely due to the good swords of our dragoons, and I was prepared to give them 
all the credit. 
As regards an escort I am afraid I am still strongly of opinion that we ought 
to have an escort ; because, if you do not, I think that the officer commanding the 
artillery will hardly act with the same vigour and decision that he would show if 
he had one. If he is continually thinking about his flanks and so on he will not 
have his mind free to attend to his proper business. I want to say this, however, 
that if you keep cavalry and Horse Artillery close together, as they were at 
Balaclava, you could get on, perhaps, without one, though I would rather have 
one even then; but from what I have seen at manceuvres, the Horse Artillery are 
often perhaps nearly a mile away, or occasionally even more, from the cavalry ; 
and on such occasions it has struck me, that when without an escort a clever 
cavalry leader might with a small force paralyze their action. In fact I have seen 
the very thing happen. Isaw one day a squadron detached from the main combat 
and go for the hostile battery at extended files, and it was a great question whether 
it would have got in or not; I think myself, and I was an umpire, that it would. 
Supposing it had. It might not, certainly I think would not, have captured the 
guns, but it might have killed a good many horses and some men and it would 
certainly have disorganized the battery and neutralized itfor atime. And it seems 
to me that it might pay to thus detach a squadron, if guns were left isolated in 
the way I have in mind. I think myself that sometimes our artillery perhaps 
forget and don’t follow the cavalry, or that the cavalry perhaps forget the artillery, 
and so it happens that the guns are exposed. I say that the strongest example 
that you can have of the need for an escort was at the fight I have quoted of 
Tobitschau where you had those 20 Austrian guns charged by only three squadrons, 
and the three squadrons did not lose a single man killed, yet captured all but 
the whole of the guns, decause the guns had not an escort. If they had had an 
escort that would have prevented Von Bredow from making that successful 
charge. 
I am very much obliged to you, geutlemen, for your kind reception of my 
lecture, and I thank you. 
1 <3 to } an hour” are the words, 
