SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1895. B31 
This form of attack is proved by history and generally acknowledged 
to be the best and most certain method of capturing a Coast Fortress. 
On this point Admiral Colomb says “ We have seen that the methods 
“ of attack by expeditions over sea had long been established, and that 
“the idea of capturing ports or islands by Naval force alone was almost 
“entirely out of view. The experience of a century marked by only 
“one or two successes, and many failures of ships against works and 
‘almost uniform success of troops, covered and supplied by ships, when 
“numerically sufficient and properly handled had quite settled the plan 
“ of attack.’?} 
(2 and 3.) To force a passage and for ravage. “Troops have been pres a 
“used in the past in conjunction with ships for attacks with either of 
“these objects, and may be so employed in the future, especially in the 
“former case, for the development of submarine mines may make the 
“clearing of a channel such a difficult operation that it may be advis- 
“able to land troops to take the Batteries of the Fortress in rear, and 
“if possible silence them before the ships attempt to clear their way 
“through.’”’? The landing of troops merely to ravage territory is not 
as we have already agreed an attack on a Coast Fortress, and therefore 
need not be considered. 
Conditions 
Before concluding this part it would be advisable to briefly consider Sovemime 
the general conditions under which the different forms of attack, “““** 
enumerated above, would probably take place. 
All operations into which the state of the sea enters as one of the 
conditions, must depend upon the command of the sea, and in this 
respect it may be noted that, ‘the command of the sea must be fought 
for if it is not admitted, and territorial attacks must cease while this 
process goes on. ‘They cannot be undertaken at all whilst the com- 
mand is in abeyance; but after it is settled, the side that holds it, 
inevitably pushes on to the attack of territory”’’ and that on the 
‘State’ of the sea at any given time depends the probability and 
nature of any attack on hostile territory. These ‘ States’ of 
the sea have been classed by Admiral Colomb as that of ‘ indiff- 
erence’ ‘when neither side attempts to hold command of particular 
waters and therefore which neither side threatens’ of ‘ disputed 
command’ and of ‘assured command,’ ‘and evidently these must 
be a continual passing from one state into a higher and back again’ ’”? 
so that we get states of temporary command lasting for longer or shorter 
intervals. Further ‘if we take these three states of the sea into our 
contemplation as conditions under which expeditions across it succeed 
or fail, we may note, that over a commanded sea no such expedition 
can be put in force at all by the inferior Naval Power, except by 
evasion, else must we admit a sea which is of disputed command or one 
1“ Naval Warfare,”’ p. 877, by Rear-Admiral P. H. Colomb. 
> RAT. “ Proceedings,” Vol. XX., p. 394. Commended Essay. 
3“ Naval Warfare,” by Rear-Admiral P. H, Colomh, p. 309. 
4 Thid p. 207. See 
5 Ibid p. 212. 
