Value of 
Command of 
the Sea. 
For Capture. 
Nayal 
Attacks 
332 SILVER MEDAL PRIZE Essay, 1895, 
that is indifferent ; on the other side the Power in command of the sea 
ought never to fail in any attack it undertakes so long as it does not 
cut itself off from its sea communications.”! 
If therefore we have a Navy powerful enough toassure the command 
of the sea, we need not fear attacks in force on our Coast Fortresses ; 
but, as to command the whole seas requires an immense, and vigilant 
fleet, and as it 1s in the power even of an inferior fleet, or of an expedi- 
tionary force to evade a superior hostile fleet, we may have to be pre- 
pared even under the most favourable circumstances to meet some 
forms of attack, especially in distant waters where owing to their re- 
moteness our command of the sea may not at the time exist in fact, or 
may have been temporarily lost. Here however such attacks can only 
be successful where there is sufficient time for their completion, if the 
capture of the place can be delayed sufficiently long, relief must come, 
and the failure of the expedition be certain, as witness the reliefs of 
Gibraltar in 1704-5. Now more than ever when the movement of ships 
and the duration of voyages are no longer dependent on fickle and 
variable winds, the power of relieving distant fortresses seems to be 
more firmly assured than heretofore, to that side which has command of 
the sea. As Admiral Colomb says “The general result of improved 
Marine Architecture therefore must be to put a check on all territorial 
attacks which depend upon an indifferent sea; as the same cause must 
tend to make a doubtful command of the sea more doubtful, and a com- 
mand of the seamore assured, the general result would appear to be rarer 
opportunities for territorial attack across a sea which is not commanded 
but much more certainty in the results of expeditions carried on by the 
Power which holds a command of the sea that cannot be challenged.’”? 
The introduction of a time element into the conditions of successful 
defence under certain circumstances would point to the conclusion that 
the value of a Coast Fortress may often lie rather in its capacity to de- 
lay capture, than in its ability to resist it altogether. 
It may be presumed that as a general rule no attack on a Coast 
Fortress will be attempted unless there is some reasonable probability 
of success attending the attempt. It remains therefore for us to ascer- 
tain under what conditions success is likely to attend the different forms 
of attack already enumerated. We will take them in the order in which 
they have been considered above. 
Nava. Atrracxs. 
(la.) Bombardment for Capture. This implies the existence of a 
temporarily commanded, or at least an inditferent sea, for no ships 
would waste their ammunition in bombarding a fortress with an enemy’s 
fleet near enough to attack them before they can replenish their 
ammunition. 
(1b.) Regular Attack by ships is out of the question except command 
of the sea is assured for a sufficiently long time, not only to permit 
1 “Naval Warfare,” by Rear-Admiral P. H. Colomb, p. 212, 
* Ibid p. 216. 
