Command of 
ng 
the sea be 
doubtiu 
336 SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESsAy, 1895. 
pate that the forces thus freed from the Coast Fortresses will probably 
be employed in expeditions against the enemy’s territory. Further, it 
would be quite legitimate to expect that, as any Huropean Power with 
which we might find ourselves at war, possesses an Army to defend its 
~ own home territory, many times larger than our available force, and as 
ir 
J. 
it would be folly to place ourselves in a position where we could hardly 
help being beaten by a much superior force, any attacks we might con- 
template on this Power’s territory would be directed against its outlying 
possessions and Colonies, and would be of the nature of those Military 
expeditions so common in the History of the Naval Wars of the seven- 
teenth and eighteenth centuries. 
Abroad. With the Command of the Sea assured, our Fortresses 
abroad would probably be exempt from any attack, for as Admiral 
Colomb says, speaking of the French raids in the West Indies during 
1710 and 1711, “These attacks where the force employed is small, 
where the distance to be passed over the sea is short, and where if a 
successful landing is effected, capture of the whole territory may follow, 
constitute perhaps the limit within which there is any chance at all of 
a successful attack on territory by the inferior Naval Force.”! When 
the command of the Sea is lost to any Power, its Naval Force in distant 
waters is likely to be very inferior, especially in the face of our own 
Naval strength, and unless the above conditions are existing, even this 
form of attack cannot take place, much less any on a greater scale re- 
quiring scrious defensive measures to resist it. 
(c.) At Home. As long as the Command of the Sea remains 
doubtful the Fleets in the home waters on both sides will be too much 
occupied with each othe’s movements to pay any attention to the attack 
of Coast Fortresses, and no expedition against them, that will be liable 
to interruption from the Sea will be possible. As long as this state 
lasts therefore our home fortresses will not probably be liable to 
any other attack than that of torpedo boats and perhaps desultory 
bombardment by occasional cruisers. If the enemy obtain a temporary 
command, invasion may be possible, but this will not affect Coast 
Fortresses as such. 
Abroad. ‘The case however with our Fortresses abroad may under 
these circumstances be quite different. The greater part of our Fleets 
will be employed in their legitimate work of trying to obtain the com- 
mand of the Sea. Itis possible therefore that in distant waters the 
enemy may have a command which, though perhaps only temporary, 
will be his long enough to enable him to attempt the conquest of 
territory lying in those seas. In this case it seems probable that ex- 
peditions will be attempted against those places likely to be most easily 
captured and held, and which like our small coaling stations will be of 
value to him when taken, proportionate to the loss that their transfer 
will be to ourselves. These attacks may be made in any of the ways 
before mentioned, but the only form of attack that can be really success- 
ful against a properly armed, and manned fortress is that, which is 
1“ Naval Warfare,” p. 821. 
