9 
SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1895. 337 
delivered by a sufficiently strong Military Expedition. The chances 
of the fortress attacked making a successful defence, depend therefore 
upon its power to meet an attack from the land side, and its ability to 
prolong its defence for a time sufficient to allow of relief arriving. 
Large fortresses requiring a very considerable force to capture them 
are not likely to be so attacked, but may expect to have to meet de- 
sultory bombardment, or even one carried out by special vessels for 
destructive purposes, if their nearness to an enemy’s Naval base per- 
mits of this being attempted without interruption, and with a reasonable 
chance of success. 
(d.) At Home. The day which sees the Command of the Sea held 
by our enemy will indeed bea distressful one for England. hen is 
made the first certain step to an invasion of these Isles, the consequences 
of which it is not pleasant to contemplate. Assuming this condition 
of things to occur, it is not clear how onr Coast Fortresses could play 
any sufficient part in helping to ward off an invasion. For the in- 
vading force would probably be landed on some convenient part of our 
open Coast line, and would be under no necessity to approach any of 
our Coast Fortresses unless it was found that its presence threatened 
their base and communications, in which case a determined assault on 
the land front would probably give the place into their hands. For it 
seems highly improbable from political reasons arising out of the panic 
that would be created by an invasion, that the very large garrisons that 
would be required to defend the land fronts of our large fortresses, like 
Plymouth or Portsmouth, would be permitted to remain to do so, while 
London was threatened; but rather that a considerable portion of them 
would be withdrawn to assist the Mield Army in resisting the advance 
of the invading forces, if only to reassure the panic-stricken inhabitants 
of the capital. But assuming that this would not be done, and that the 
necessary garrisons were left in the Coast Fortresses to hold them, the 
chief part they would have to undertake in the event of attack would 
be the defence of their land fronts; for though no doubt whenever it 
was considered imperative to reduce such a fortress, the land attack 
would be assisted by naval operations on the sea front, still these latter 
will have a less chance than ever of being successful by themselves for 
it will be in the power of the defenders to completely obstruct their 
own waters with mines, torpedoes, &c., without fear of injuring their 
own shipping (which must anyhow fall an easy prey to the enemy), and 
thus to keep the enemy’s ships at long ranges from their forts ; so that 
if the speedy capture of the place is desired, as it will be, the real attack 
must be made against the land defences. 
It has not been thought necessary to consider the question of in- 
vasion under any other conditions than that of the assured command of 
the Sea, to the enemy. The only other possible condition is invasion 
by evasion, that is by eluding our Fleet, and throwing a force on to our 
shores, that must take its chance of making its own footing and being 
able to obtain supports, and reinforcements as required, after it has 
landed. ‘This is such a very risky operation that it can be only under- 
taken when the invading force is likely to receive assistance from the 
The command 
of the sew 
being lost. 
