366 COMMENDED Essay, 1895. 
Battery Commanders themselves in the selection of projectiles suitable 
for different objectives and in choosing the portion to be aimed at. 
Except for these purposes steam-launches would be fairly satisfactory 
substitutes. 
Nothing would be learnt from these operations unless the results 
were tested, that is to say unless it could be ascertained what action 
was taken consequent on the orders issued by the Fire Commander, 
and whether there was any unnecessary delay in their execution. 
Blank ammunition will to some extent shew this, but not sufficiently. 
io satisfy himself on this point the Fire Commander would require 
officers as assistants on the gun-floor of each Battery who would record 
the action taken there on the receipt of each order and would note the 
time of its receipt, a comparison of watches with that of the Fire 
Commander having of course been made beforehand. In this way it 
might be possible to trace the point in the chain of command at which 
any failure had occurred either in interpreting correctly or in carrying 
out the Fire Commander’s order, or where there had been any 
unnecessary delay. 
Not the least important result of this drill would be the opportunity 
it would give the Fire Commander of gauging the capacity of his 
Battery Commanders, and them too of becoming acquainted with his 
way of working; a further consequence again of this better mutual 
understanding being probably a reduction in the number of orders 
which the lire Commander would find it necessary to give, as also in 
the chance of their being misunderstood. The Fire Commander’s 
programme ought certainly to include a manning of the Batteries by 
night both to give practice in laying with the aid of the electric light, 
and to accustom the men to fall into their places without noise and 
confusion. 
Care should be taken that during the operations the defenders should 
be kept in ignorance, if possible, of the nature of attack to be made on 
the forts, the time of its delivery, or the constitution of the attacking 
squadron. There would be no difficulty in ensuring secrecy on these 
points if the attack were in the hands of the Royal Navy. Keeping 
the garrisons of the Batteries in ignorance of the enemy’s plans would 
have the advantage of obliging them to keep a proper look-out by day 
and night, of necessitating regular reliefs and attention being paid to 
the rule that a larger proportion of the garrison should not be kept on 
the alert than is compatable with the men having a proper amount of 
rest. It would also accustom Fire and Battery Commanders to dealing 
with situations requiring prompt decision, and those under them to 
acting according to circumstances instead of necessarily in accordance 
with a pre-arranged programme. 
Tae Mannine or toe Forrress. 
It may probably be assumed that if, as has been suggested, the 
complete manning of the fortress took place at intervals of 5 years, 
each Fire Commander would during that time have had sufficient 
opportunities of exercising his forts together, that he would have 
