2 
a ship is cleared for action, for which purpose special bunkers should be supplied. 
The existing means on board ship for suppressing a fire seem inadequate. 
Finally, the relative values of certain materials of construction have been 
determined with some precision. Plates and structures of soft metal were not 
split or smashed, but twisted and put out of shape; so that they were susceptible 
of rapid repair either on board ship or in the arsenals. 
The Japanese in particular made note of this when they had to repair the 
“Matsushima” which was fresh from the hands of its French constructors (Forges 
et Chantiers de la Méditerranée). This coast-guard vessel had suffered terribly, 
and the quality of the chief material of construction was much appreciated. In 
other ships, built with harder metal which had been split or broken, some repairs 
were extremely difficult. 
2°—Prorsuctron. Armour doubtless played an important part. It stopped 
the projectiles of quick-firing ordnance, whereas all unarmoured parts were hacked 
to pieces, as might have been expected. But armour of moderate thickness all 
over a ship’s side would certainly have done more service than a thick belt. All 
the more so in future when the use of melinite shells may have to be reckoned 
with. Few shells strike the water line, the mean point of impact being much 
higher. Practical armour piercing is also much inferior to theoretical, mainly 
because the trajectory of a shell is rarely, if ever, normal to the surface struck. 
On the other hand armour is not sufficient to command success, for in this 
respect the Japanese were much less protected than the Chinese. It seems certain 
that as mere dead weight, an increased artillery would be preferable to an increase 
of armour. 
The hypothesis of a ship with a riddled hull continuing the fight, because its 
machinery, turrets and armoured bridge are intact, is illusory. Such a ship floats, 
it is true, but may be considered disabled and will be obliged to withdraw from 
the fight. 
The armoured bridge does not always afford complete invulnerability. A 
Chinese ship had a portion of her bridge carried away by a 32°™ (12'6) shell. 
A few minutes later she foundered and went down by the stern. 
It would appear that the Chinese would have lost fewer ships had thay paid 
more attention to water-tight compartments. None of the ships were armed with 
nickel-steel or Harveyized plates. The coal bunkers gave good protection. In 
one ship they are said to have stopped a shell of large calibre. 
3°—Ram. Its effect was nil. Several attempts were made, but none quite 
succeeded. We must not conclude from this that the ram is useless. For it may 
well serve to annihilate a ship already disabled by artillery and torpedoes, or on 
the other hand a ship with its artillery silenced may as a final effort attempt to 
ram a better armed vessel which steers badly. 
4°—Sprep, This element exercised a predominant influence. Admiral Ito, 
thanks to his superior speed, was able to fight the Chinese at the ranges which 
suited him best and to take the offensive. He shewed that a swift well armed 
cruiser can accept battle with a big battle ship. However, continuous evolutions 
at high speed necessitate an enormous consumption of coal. 
5°AUXILIARY CRUISERS. One of these, the “Saikio,” an armed merchant 
ship, was surrounded and her rudder was disabled. She was in great danger, and 
part of the Japanese fleet had to go to her assistance. Such ships, having no pro- 
tection, should not attempt to come to close quarters, but should be provided 
with powerful artillery so as to assume the offensive at a long range, and high 
speed to maintain it. 
It was clearly seen at the Yalu how a slow ship could encumber the movements 
of a squadron. 
