3 
6°——RIFLE FIRE. Effect nil. Mitrailleuses were useful at times, but rifles 
which employ many men were useless in comparison with mitrailleuses at all 
ranges. 
7°—Torpgpors. Locomotive torpedoes played but a small part in this en- 
gagement. In view of the ravages made in the batteries by artillery fire the 
presence of torpedoes in their tubes constituted an ever present and real danger. 
The Japanese left their torpedoes in bunks. Several Chinese ships threw them 
into the sea to get rid of them. 
Submarine tubes are not liable to this drawback, and would appear to be the 
only suitable method for discharging torpedoes from battle ships. The Chinese 
tried to torpedo several Japanese ships, notably the group of small ships which 
they surrounded. But, although the distance was only 80 metres, none of the 
torpedoes reached their mark. These attempts, made first with a torpedo boat, 
then with a cruiser, imply gross inexperience. The distance was really too small 
for torpedoes projected at an angle of depression, for one of them passed under 
the “Akagi.” This constitutes an argument in favour of torpedo tubes being 
only slightly depressed and as near as possible to the water line. It is generally 
believed, and probably with truth, that if the Japanese had had any torpedo 
boats they would have inflicted still heavier losses on their opponents than 
actually occurred. And, notwithstanding its injuries, their fleet might not have 
been obliged to leave the field of battle at nightfall had they had any torpedo 
catchers to oppose to those of the Chinese. 
8°—ARTILLERY. This arm exercised a predominant influence throughout. It 
was in fact gun fire which subdued the Chinese fleet. The highest calibre 
in the Chinese fleet was 30°5°™ (12") Krupp; in the Japanese the 82 °™ (12’"6) 
Canet with a length of 40 calibres, one shell from which, as stated above, gutted 
an armoured bridge and sank the ship. On the other hand some 30°5 ™ shells 
disabled the barbette tower of the ‘‘ Matsushima ” when the 32 ™ gnns had fired 
but 4 rounds. One of the former shells burst in the central battery of the same 
ship causing a conflagration and killing or disabling 80 men. 
It is evident that the 30°5 ™ and 32°™ guns had a considerable excess of power 
as against the plates of medium thickness to which they were opposed, and that 
heavy shells with high velocity crash through all they meet and have an 
annihilating effect. 
It was proved however that simplicity in the working of such guns was of the 
first importance. The loading of the heaviest guns is bound to be a slow job. 
The hydraulic gear acted very well at first, but in some cases, after the firing of 
3 or 4 rounds, bursting shells broke the hydraulic tubes and disabled the hoists 
and the laying gear. There should have been means of working the guns by 
hand. Electricity would be equally liable to injury from shell fire, but would 
admit of simpler arrangements. The advocates of electricity have always pointed 
out the danger of frost in connection with hydraulic gear. 
One of the official reports on this subject during the war says: ‘“ Hydraulic 
gear was a source of much anxiety in frosty weather, in that stoves had to be 
constantly kept alight in the region of the turret and the working gear. It is 
believed that electric motors or even hand gear would have been preferable.” 
The 30°5°™ guns of the Chinese ships were in pairs, and generally one was 
loaded with a commou shell, the other with a chilled or steel shell. 
The simultaneous firing of the 2 guns, for which there was of course no good 
reason, was sufficient to cause some damage to the ship itself, so great was the 
shock to the hull. 
10°—Qurck-rirtne GuNs. As regards this class of armament the Japanese 
had an incontestable superiority. The Chinese had still Krupp guns with wedge 
