4 
breech-pieces, the manipulation of which is too slow. It must be added that the 
shooting on both sides from the guns of medium calibre was very wanting in 
accuracy, and the expenditure of ammunition was considerable. 
When the three Japanese ships had been separated from the rest of the squadron 
the Chinese held them under their fire and should have been able to overwhelm 
them. The Japanese however escaped owing to the courage and mancuvring 
skill of their men. 
It has been ascertained that several of the steel armour-piercing shells of the 
Japanese 12°™ (4°72) guns did not penetrate very deeply into the Chinese 
armour. At the ranges at which the battle was fought these guns had a relatively 
low remaining velocity, and it is believed that the English guns which the Japanese 
had did not possess sufficient muzzle velocity. It was scarcely 700 m.s. (2296 f.s.). 
The effect would have been much greater with about 800 m.s. (2625 f.s.). In 
addition to the increased vis viva, a flatter trajectory is obtained with a very high 
muzzle velocity, so much so that we may almost hope to lay guns point blank at 
the ordinary battle range of about 2000 yards. Otherwise the 12 ™ showed itself 
to be an excellent calibre, easy to work and every way suitable for a cruiser. 
11°—Disposition or THE GUNS. The drawbacks of an armour-plated central 
battery were made apparent when one shell disabled 80 men of the “Matsushima.” 
To meet this every gun should have its own armoured emplacement, and this more 
especially in the case of heavy guns, which should never be mounted in pairs, 
whatever advantages that method may afford in the reduction of weight. 
The smallest accident to the lifts or laying gear of a double gunned turret at 
once disables from one half to two thirds of a ship’s offensive power. 
This has often been stated. It has now been proved. At the very commence- 
ment of the action the twin 30° (12) guns of a Chinese barbette ship were 
disabled by a small shell, of which some fragments struck the hydraulic apparatus. 
In the same way a single big gun, as on board the “ Matsushima,” is insufli- 
cient. It is better to have two of rather smaller calibre, 
It would appear that existing barbette turrets do not protect sufficiently the 
men or machinery of the gun from the fire of small guns, a single shell from 
which may disable the barbette gun. Before however pronouncing irrevocably in 
favour of closed turrets we must remember their disadvantages: their weight, and 
their forming with the gun and its platform one single structure. What in fact 
would be the result of a shell not piercing a turret, but shaking the whole 
structure ? 
In any case guns must not be too close to one another, and all guus must have 
as wide a field of fire as possible to meet the varying circumstances of an engage- 
ment between two squadrons constantly performing rapid evolutions. 
Broadside fire is henceforward useless, likewise electric firing from a distance. 
We may remark here that during the engagement all the channels for the electric 
connections of the firing gear of the quick-firing guns were damaged by the 
discharge of the big guns. 
12°--EFFECTS OF PROJECTILES. There is no record of the penetration of 
thick armour by any steel shell. The Chinese chiefly fired common shell from 
their 80°5°™ guns. Of course a steel armour-piercing shell is comparatively 
useless against a cruiser. Neither of the fleets possessed any double shells, or 
any shells with high explosives. The effect of these may be guessed by the 
performance of the common shells. 
13°—SupPLy OF AMMUNITION. The Japanese big guns fired but few rounds ; 
only 12 shells from the three 32 °™ guns of the three coast-guard ships, a mean of 
only 4 rounds each. 
On the other hand the quick-firing guns disposed of a large quantity of ammu- 
