5 
nition. They report 200 rounds for a single 12°™ gun. At a given moment on 
board the “ Matsushima” one hundred rounds were fired from 11 quick-firers in 
little more than a minute. It is said that one of the reasons why the Japanese 
withdrew their fleet at nightfall was the exhaustion of their supply of quick-firing 
ammunition. 
On the Chinese side the eight 30°5°™ guns fired 197 rounds, say 24 to 25 each. 
Those of 15 °™ (6) 268 rounds, or 67 each. But these were not quick-firers. 
The Chinese began first with common shell, and when no more of them were to 
be had they continued their fire with steel shell. The latter, as already stated, 
were found to be less efficient than the former. There was, especially in the 
Chinese fleet, a reckless squandering of ammunition, so it would be unwise to 
deduce any scheme of supply from their operations. But, as regards quick-firers, 
it would appear that 200 rounds per gun may be considered an adequate, but not 
excessive supply. 
14°—FigutinG raANGE. The Chinese opened fire at 4000 metres (some say 
5000). The Japanese reserved theirs till they were 3000 to 3500 metres from 
the enemy. 
At 2000 metres the cannonade became very lively. The Japanese, who con- 
stantly manceuvred at high speed, maintained a distance from the enemy, according 
to some accounts, of from 900 to 1400 metres. From this to 2000 metres may 
be considered the mean fighting range. If that be admitted, the advantage of 
high velocity and trajectory so flat as to admit of point blank firing at 2000 
metres is apparent. ‘The distances constantly vary, and it would be a very great 
advantage to be relieved from the necessity of continually altering the tangent 
scale. 
The evolutions occasionally brought the 2 fleets to within a hundred metres of 
one another. At such times rapid firing guns become a first necessity, and the 
degree of rapidity attainable in breech closing and firing is no longer a negligeable 
quantity. 
Some have foretold for armoured ships an engagement at short range, with low 
velocity guns and highly explosive shells. This would at least have the advantage 
of utilising guns of old design. But such tactics can find no place where there 
are rapid cruisers maintaining a position at ordinary artillery ranges with an 
armament of high velocity guns. 
Moreover the fire of the aforesaid low velocity guns would be speedily subdued 
even at short ranges by that of quick-firers. 
In conclusion then it would seem that the battle of the Yalu points to the 
necessity of high velocities both from tactical and ballistic points of view. 
It would seem also, as already stated, that armour should give place to increased 
artillery of higher power and each gun with a wider zone of action. 
Otherwise naval war will be only a bloody struggle, in which both fleets will 
retire shattered and disabled, unable to again take the sea, and without victory on 
either side. . 
As has been justly said: defensive arms retard defeat, offensive arms give 
victory. 
828 
