4, 
columns to consist of 20 carriages, there would be a total of 600 rounds or 150 
rounds per piece in addition to the 20 rounds with the battery. 
On the march the datteries d’armée would, as a rule, follow the columns and 
trains of the army corps, in connection with which they have been mobilized. 
According to General Speck, on a good road no slopes of less than 8 degrees would 
offer any inconvenience to the batteries of shell-guns, which would keep pace with 
the infantry. On bad roads, however, this pace could not be kept up. He makes 
no attempt to conceal the difficulties, which the heavy batteries would encounter 
as soon as they came near the enemy’s position, when roads are blocked and move- 
ments become more and more difficult. In spite of this the heavy batteries would 
have to be pushed to the front by forced marches ; and a careful reconnaissance of 
the roads would have to be made as their quality is a most important factor in the 
movements of the batteries. This reconnaissance must necessarily entail a loss of 
time, by which the defenders ought to know how to profit. 
So long as the employment of the artillerie @armée is not imminent, it may 
follow the army corps to which it is attached, in the same manner as all the heavy 
batteries follow the armies. As soon as the attack of a fortified position is con- 
templated, it will be decided, according to the nature of the enemy’s works, which 
of the batteries must march with the columns of attack. If the works have only 
been constructed since the war began, the shell-guns should be sufficient, and 
should be placed at the tail of the fighting columns of troops. They should not 
be pushed further forward unless the distance to be traversed is short, and cover 
can be obtained from ground. If permanent works have to be attacked, mortars 
as well as shell-guns must be brought up, 
Owing to the length of time which the da¢ter ies d’armée must necessarily take in 
coming to the front of the column, it is most important that the army corps should be 
able to march on several roads. Also, they move so slowly and offer so large a mark 
to the enemy’s guns, that it is almost indispensable that they should be able to move 
into position under cover from ground. With this object in view, it will often be 
necessary to leave the main roads and take to bye-roads of uncertain character. A 
careful reconnaissance of these roads will be necessary to avoid delays. General 
Speck considers that a company of infantry must be attached to each batterie 
d’armée to clear away obstacles, prepare emplacements for the platforms, &c. It 
is evident that such operations can only be carried out under cover from the view 
and fire of the enemy, and therefore the infantry must previously be employed to 
drive back the enemy’s advanced-posts. As this first phase of the struggle will 
probably take some time, and as the movements of the heavy batteries will be 
slow, it will probably be difficult to complete the operations in one day. It may 
therefore be expected that after the completion of these preliminary operations, 
the artillerie d’armée will not be able to open fire before the following morning at 
the earliest, and a delay will thus be caused in the operations of the assailants. 
This delay will be to the advantage of the defenders, who will gain time to bring 
up reinforcements, or to strengthen their field-works. 
The position of the assailant will hardly be better when in front of temporary 
works. In this case also a careful reconnaissance will be necessary to avoid false 
movements of the columns of the artillerie d’armée. These heavy batteries lack 
the mobility of field guns. It is difficult for them to change position, consequently 
the ground must be carefully reconnoitred beforehand. 
It must be remarked that batteries using curved fire can generally be placed in 
position more easily than those using direct fire, because it is not necessary that 
they should have a clear field in front of them. They may be placed behind obstacles 
which shut out the view, as it is sufficient that the result of the fire should be ob- 
served from a position near at hand and connected with the batteries by telephone, 
if necessary. This diminishes the length of the necessary reconnaissance; but fire 
